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GOODS: A COMPARISON WITH SECTION
2-207 UCC AND THE UNIDROIT
PRINCIPLES
By Maria del Pilar Perales Viscasillast
Institute of International Commercial Law of the
Pace University School of Law
Essay Contest
I. INTRODUCTION
The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the Inter-
national Sale of Goods, known as the Vienna Convention of
1980 (CISG),' is presently part of the law of approximately fifty
countries. 2 This wide acceptance by nations with vastly differ-
t This article was submitted to the Student Essay Contest of the Institute of
International Commercial Law at the end of December 1995. Prior to the final
decision in September 1997, the selected articles were given the opportunity to
update the information originally submitted. Doctor in Law, 1996. University
Carlos III of Madrid
1 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, Apr. 11, 1980, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 97/18, Annex I, reprinted in 19 I.L.M.
668 [hereinafter CISGI.
2 As of 14 September 1998, the Vienna Convention is part of the domestic law
of 53 countries: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia-Herzego-
vina, Bulgaria, Burundi, Canada, Chile, China, Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece,
Guinea, Hungary, Iraq, Italy, Latvia, Lesotho, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mexico,
Republic of Moldova, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland,
Romania, Russian Federation, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Syria, Uganda, Ukraine, United States, Uzbekistan, Yugoslavia and
Zambia. Ghana and Venezuela have signed it, but have not yet decided to ratify it.
The Official Text is in United Nations Convention on Contracts for the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods (A/CONF.97/18, Annex I), p.178 et seq, and in United Nations
Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Vienna, Official
Records (ACONF.97/19). New York: United Nations, 1991. The works that led to
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ent social, legal and economic systems demonstrates the consid-
erable success obtained by the Convention. The reasons for the
wide approval of this text are many. In relation to its predeces-
sor - The Hague Conventions of 1964,3 and specifically the Uni-
form Law on Formation of the Contracts (ULF), the Vienna
Convention has emerged as a text with evident and substantial
improvements. These changes were implemented largely in re-
sponse to criticisms of the Hague texts.
During the CISG development process, many nations were
represented. In contrast, only 62 nations participated in the
Diplomatic Conference on the New Uniform Sales Law; 22 were
the adoption of the Convention are summarized in: a) in the Official Records,
where there is also a comment for each article of the previous Draft (1978 Draft)
prepared by the UNCITRAL Secretariat: Commentary on the Draft Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, prepared by the Secretariat (Al
CONF.97/5, in A/CONF.97/19, p.14 et seq); and b) the UNCITRAL Yearbooks (vol.
10.). CISG Articles to be cited as "Article" hereinafter.
3 The move toward a uniform law of international trade began in April 1930
when UNIDROIT, or the Rome Institute, took the initiative of founding a Working
Group in charge of the drafting of a Uniform Law on international sales. Two
Drafts were prepared: one on the formation of international contracts by corre-
spondence ("Loi uniforme sur la formation des contrats internationaux par cor-
respondance"); the other related to the performance of the contract, which was
drafted on the basis of the work of Professor Ernst Rabel, DAS RECHT DES
WARENKAUFS, vol. 1 (1936), I (1958). The importance of Rabel's work is under-
lined by its use as the basis of the deliberations during the 1964 Hague Confer-
ence. See Ernst von Caemmerer, Die Haager konferenz dber die internationale
Vereinheitlichung des Kaufrechts, vom 2, bis 25, april 1964, 1965, vol. 29, p. 10 1 et
seq; see also Peter Schlechtriem, Einheitliches UN-Kaufrecht. Thbingen: J.C.B.
Mohr, 1981, p. 1 et seq; in regard to the last author, we will follow the English
translation of his book: UNIFORM SALEs LAw, The UN-Convention on Contracts for
the International Sale of Goods, (1986). The work of UNIDROIT was interrupted
during to the Second World War, but it recommenced when an International Diplo-
matic Conference was convened in The Hague in 1951. In 1959 a Draft Uniform
Law on Formation of International Sales Contracts was published; also published
was a Draft Uniform Law on International Sales Contracts in 1956. In 1964, a
new Diplomatic Conference was convened to work on the two Drafts. After three
weeks of intensive work, two Conventions were adopted. One related to Uniform
Law on International Sales Contract that incorporated as an annex a Uniform
Law: Uniform Law on the International Sales (ULIS). The other related to the
Formation of the Contracts and also incorporated a Uniform Law on that theme:
Uniform Law on Formation of International Sales Contracts (ULF). The Hague
Sales Convention entered into force 18 August 1972; The Hague Formation Con-
vention on 23 August 1972. More recently, their value has become more limited
because the 1980 Vienna Convention has successfully replaced these texts. Accord-
ing to Article 99(3) CISG: a state which ratifies, accepts, approves, or accedes to
the CISG and is a party to either or both the Hague Conventions shall at the same
time denounce either or both Hague Conventions.
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol10/iss1/5
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European or other developed Western Sates, 11 socialist, 11
South-American, 7 African and 11 Asian countries. 4 Adopted by
countries that account for over two-thirds of all world trade in
goods, a wide spectrum of legal cultures has made the CISG the
law of the land: from developing countries to the developed,
from free market economies to countries with planned econo-
mies, and Civil as well as Common Law legal systems.
A complex text was achieved through the participation of
countries with varying legal, economic and political systems.
There was worldwide participation during the Diplomatic Con-
ference that lead to the development of the Vienna Convention.
Hence, there was wide support for the ratification of the final
text. The CISG has overcome, not without difficulties, many ju-
ridical obstacles encountered during the evolution of the text
and in working toward the goal of universal application. It is on
the triple plane, however, of Civil Law/Common Law conflict,
economics (North-South conflict), and politics (East-West con-
flict), where the most difficult debates took place during the Vi-
enna Diplomatic Conference.
The greatest obstacles arose during the technical-legal con-
frontations between Common Law countries and Civil Law
countries. 5 Part II of the Convention, dedicated to the formation
of the contract by offer and acceptance, is a typical place to find
the practice of compromise between the Civil Law and Common
Law systems. The meeting point of these systems is best de-
scribed in an analysis of the formative problems of a contract.
In the traditional analysis of two declarations of will, offer and
acceptance, there are also conflict divergencies that seem, at
4 See Gyula Eorsi, A Propos the Vienna Convention on Contracts for the Inter-
national Sale of Goods, 31 AM. J. COMP. L. 333, 335 n. 5 (1983), who adds that the
most outstanding difference between ULIS and the CISG consists precisely in the
considerable decrease of rigor commercialis, that was achieved due to the change
in the composition of the participant countries.
During the 1964 Hague Diplomatic Conference the distribution of the partici-
pating States was as follows: developed (78.6%) and developing (10.7%), while dur-
ing the 1980 Vienna Diplomatic Conference the distribution was: developed
(35.5%) and developing (46.8%). See Gabrielle Brussel, The 1980 United Nations
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: A legislative study of
the North-South Debates, 6 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 53, 61 (1993).
5 See Manuel Olivencia, La Convenci6n de las Naciones Unidas sobre los
Contratos de Compraventa Internacional de Mercaderias: Antecedentes Hist6ricos y
Estado Actual 201 REVISTA DE DERECHO MERCANTIL 377, 394 (1992).
19981
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first look, impossible to solve. In fact, Part II makes evident in
many of its dispositions a compromise between States with dif-
ferent legal principles: open-price contracts (Articles 14(1) and
55 CISG);6 revocability and irrevocability of the offer (Article 16
CISG);7 counter-offers (Article 19 CISG);8 and the receipt theory
as the moment in which the declarations of will, including the
conclusion of the contract, are effective (Articles 23 and 24
CISG).9 These Articles show a balance, in most cases, between
the different principles which form the basis of varying legal
systems. This does not mean, however, that the formation rules
of the Convention are a just a patchwork of varying provisions.
The drafters did not merely appropriate Civil or Common law
6 Article 14(1) states: "A proposal for concluding a contract addressed to one
or more specific persons constitutes an offer if it is sufficiently definite and indi-
cates the intention of the offeror to be bound in case of acceptance. A proposal is
sufficiently definite if it indicates the goods and expressly or implicitly fixes or
makes provision for determining the quantity and the price."
Article 55 states: "Where a contract has been validly concluded but does not ex-
pressly or implicitly fix or make provision for determining the price, the parties are
considered, in the absence of any indication to the contrary, to have impliedly
made reference to the price generally charged at the time of the conclusion of the
contract for such goods sold under comparable circumstances in the trade con-
cerned." See id. at art. 55.
7 Article 16 indicates that: "1. Until a contract is concluded an offer may be
revoked if the revocation reaches the offeree before he has dispatched an accept-
ance. 2. However, an offer cannot be revoked: (a) If it indicates, whether by stating
a fixed time for acceptance or otherwise, that it is irrevocable; or (b) If it was rea-
sonable for the offeree to rely on the offer as being irrevocable and the offeree has
acted in reliance on the offer."
8 Conflict-compromise lines present throughout the Convention are said to be
Civil Law v. Common Law, North-South, and East-West. See Eorsi, supra note 2,
at 342 n. 4. Eorsi refers to the Article 19 conflict-compromise as East-West. A
sharper delineation is provided by Farnsworth, who refers to Article 19 as a con-
flict-compromise between traditionalists and reformers. See E.A. Farnsworth, AR-
TICLE 19 in C.M. Bianca & M.J. Bonell, COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALES
LAw; THE 1980 VIENNA SALES CONVENTION 175 (1987). Article 19(1), with its mir-
ror image rule, reflects the point of view of the traditionalists, while paragraph (2)
corresponds to the desires of the reformers. The compromise, however, balances in
favor of the traditionalists, thanks to the introduction of paragraph (3) of Article
19 CISG.
9 Article 23: "A contract is concluded at the moment when an acceptance of
an offer becomes effective in accordance with the provisions of this Convention."
Article 24: "For the purposes of this Part of the Convention, an offer, declaration of
acceptance or any other indication of intention 'reaches' the addressee when it is
made orally to him or delivered by any other means to him personally, to his place
of business or mailing address or, if he does not have a place of business or mailing
address, to his habitual residence."
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol10/iss1/5
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rules or rules common to different legal systems. On the con-
trary, though the document shows some legal compromise, it
nonetheless has emerged as its own unique system. It was
formed to facilitate ease of international commercial in-
terchange, based on the influence of developed trade practices
and with the goal of permanent application. Ultimately, the
Convention provides its own autonomous interpretation in ac-
cordance with the principles of uniformity, internationalism,
and good faith.10
One of the most interesting problems in the study of Part II
of the Convention is the conflict between clauses of general con-
ditions exchanged by the parties. The Vienna Convention
adopts a different solution than that contained in the law of the
United States: Section 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC), and in the Principles of International Commercial Con-
tracts formulated by the International Institute for the Unifica-
tion of Private Law, known as UNIDROIT or the Rome
Institute.1
The legal system of the United States, through its two most
important recapitulations of contractual matters, perfectly re-
flects the tension between classical contractual law, represented
by the Restatement and case law, and the criterion introduced
by the UCC. The Restatement of Contracts is part of a series of
Restatements of the Law created by the American Law Insti-
tute with the purpose of compiling general principles of the
Common Law. Although the Restatements are not law, they
possess great weight in doctrine and case law. After several
modifications, the present text of the Restatement of Contracts,
accompanied by commentaries and examples, was published in
1981.12 Article 2 of the UCC, on the other hand, contains sales
law sections that can be the object of amendments by individual
10 Article 7 (1): "In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had to
its international character and to the need to promote uniformity in its application
and the observance of good faith in international trade. 2. Questions concerning
matters governed by this Convention which are not expressly settled in it are to be
settled in conformity with the general principles on which it is based or, in the
absence of such principles, in conformity with the law applicable by virtue of the
rules of private international law." See CISG, supra note 2, art. 7.
11 International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS, (Rome 1994) [hereinafter UNIDROIT
Principles].
12 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (1981).
1998]
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states. The UCC has been adopted by all states, except Louisi-
ana.' 3 The UCC is accompanied by an Official Commentary,' 4
as is the Restatement. As indicated, the Restatement has not
been adopted by the states, but it nonetheless is of great signifi-
cance. The importance of the CISG's entry into force in the
United States (and generally in all the States that adopt it) is
that the U.S. now has two codes related to sales contracts: Arti-
cle 2 of the UCC and the CISG. The former applies generally to
domestic sales contracts, whereas the latter applies to those in-
ternational sales contracts that are within its scope of applica-
tion (Articles 1 to 6 CISG).
The Principles of International Commercial Contracts pre-
pared by UNIDROIT15 have been compared with the American
13 However, effective January 1, 1995, Article 1943 Louisiana Civil Code ("An
acceptance not in accordance with the terms of the offer is deemed to be a counterof-
fer") was superceded by new Articles 2601 and 2602 which closely follow section 2-
207 UCC. See Stephan Kinsella, Smashing the Broken Mirror: The Battle of the
Forms, UCC 2-207, and Louisiana's Improvements, 53 LA. L. REV. 1555 -56 (1993).
New Article 2601 reads as follows:
Art. 2601. Additional terms in acceptance of offer to sell a movable.
An expression of acceptance of an offer to sell a movable thing suffices
to form a contract of sale if there is agreement on the thing and the price,
even though the acceptance contains terms additional to, or different
from, the terms of the offer, unless acceptance is made conditional on the
offeror's acceptance of the additional or different terms. Where the accept-
ance is not so conditioned, the additional or different terms are regarded
as proposals for modification and must be accepted by the offeror in order
to become a part of the contract.
Between merchants, however, additional terms become part of the
contract unless they alter the offer materially, or the offer expressly limits
the acceptance to the terms of the offer, or the offeree is notified of the
offeror's objection to the additional terms within a reasonable time, in all
of which cases the additional terms do not become a part of the contract.
Additional terms alter the offer materially when their nature is such that
it must be presumed that the offeror would not have contracted on those
terms. Id. at 1558.
New Article 2602 Contract by Conduct of the Parties indicates that:
A contract of sale of movables may be established by conduct of both
parties that recognizes the existence of that contract even though the com-
munications exchanged by them do not suffice to form a contract. In such
a case the contract consists of those terms on which the communications
of the parties agree, together with any applicable provisions of the supple-
mentary law. Id. at 1559.
14 See U.C.C. 1995 OFFICIAL TEXT, WITH COMMENTS.
15 UNIDROIT work, which initially received the name of "Progressive Codifi-
cation of International Trade Law" started in the early 1970's. The first session,
which convened in 1974, was limited in scope and focused mainly on the general
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol10/iss1/5
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Restatements. 16 They are a set of Principles whose objective is
to provide a Uniform Code in matters related to international
commercial contracts and were clearly inspired by the Vienna
Sales Convention. The section of UNIDROIT dedicated to the
Formation of International Contracts (Article 2), with the ex-
ception of some divergences, parallels the Vienna text. This
means that the UNIDROIT Principles should be interpreted by
taking into account the legislative history of the whole text of
the Vienna Convention, without that being an obstacle for a re-
ciprocal influence between them. In other words, the
UNIDROIT Principles may be useful as a tool to interpret and
integrate the Uniform Law.17 One of the most interesting issues
in the UNIDROIT Principles is its relationship to the Conven-
tion (since the Preamble states that the Principles may be used
to interpret and supplement other international texts), particu-
larly in those circumstances where both texts apply to a busi-
ness transaction or when the CISG is silent on a specific issue
which receives an express solution in the UNIDROIT Princi-
ples. This is the case for the issue of battle-of-the-forms.
The fact that the Convention does not have a specific rule
addressing the battle-of-the forms issue, whereas the
UNIDROIT Principles do, may suggest that the Convention
part of contractual law of some contracts, among them, the sales contract. After
several drafts, the final text was approved in 1994. It contains 109 Articles with 7
chapters; its objectives are several: to serve as a model for national and interna-
tional legislators; to serve as well as a model of interpretation to the international
instruments, among them, the Vienna Convention of 1980; to be useful as a guide
for the drafting of contracts; and, finally, to create a sort of common principles for
all legal systems.
16 See Franco Ferrari, Le Champ D'application Des "Principes Pour les Con-
trats Commerciaux Internationaux" Elabores Par UNIDROIT, 4 REVUE INTERNATI-
ONALE DE DROIT COMPARE 985, 988 n. 4 (1995).
17 This is one of the tasks the drafters of the Principles set forth in its Pream-
ble. About this and other objectives of the Restatement, see the Preamble of the
Principles (Purpose of the Principles): "They may be used to interpret or supplement
international uniform law instruments." UNIDROIT, supra note 9. This is clearly
the opinion of Ulrich Magnus, Die allegemeinen Grundsatze im UN-Kaufrecht, 59
Rabels Zeitshcrift 469, 492 (1995); he indicates that the agreement between the
Convention and the Principles it is not a surprise since the Vienna text may be
considered the "godfather" of the Principles. See also Klaus Peter Berger, Die
UNIDROIT-Prinzipien fur Internationale Handelsvertrdg 94 Zeitschrift fir Ver-
gleichende Rechts-wissenschaft 217, 218 (1995). See generally del Pilar Perales
Viscasillas, UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts: Sphere
of Application and General Provisions, 13 ARIz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 380 (1996).
1998]
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does not provide an answer to this problem. A national judge or
arbitrator might therefore be tempted to apply a solution, such
as the one stated in Principles Article 2.22, in supplementation
of the Convention."' This situation could occur if the tribunal is
unaware of the objectives of the Convention and the legislative
history of CISG Article 19 and thereby permit themselves to be
influenced by the aversion to applying the last-shot rule by some
Convention scholars. 19 It is important to point out that we are
not dealing with a mere academic issue, since there is an in-
creasing tendency among arbitrators and judges to resort to the
UNIDROIT Principles, 20 even in cases of transactions which
18 Scholars have also supported this approach. See Alejandro Garro, The Gap
Filling Role of the UNIDROIT Principles in International Sale Law: Some Com-
ments on the Interplay between the Principles and the CISG, 68 TUL. L. REV.
1149,1169 (1995) (considering the application of the Principles to the Convention
acceptable).
19 See Joseph Perillo, UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial
Contracts: the black letter text and a review, 63 FORDHAM L. REV 288 (1994) (com-
paring CISG Article 19 with PICC Article 2.22: "The battle-of-the forms receives
innovative and generally sound treatment in Principles").
20 See Cour d'appel of Grenoble 23 October 1996 (France) (PACE) (UNILEX)
as the first national decision that refers in its ruling to the UNIDROIT Principles.
The Court refers to Article 6.1.6 of the UNIDROIT Principles and CISG Article
57.1(a) as adopting the same principles. The first arbitral award mentioning the
UNIDROIT Principles judged a dispute between an Austrian seller and a German
buyer. They have stated that in the relations between merchants it is normal that
the seller, due to the payment delay, turns to the rate of interests of its own State;
a solution that the tribunal says will be obtained from an application of Article
7.4.9 of the UNIDROIT Principles. See two arbitration decisions of the Interna-
tionales Schiedsgericht der Bundeskammer der gewerblichen Wirtschaft-Wien, 15
June 1994, respectively (SCH-4366) and (SCH-4318) (Austria) (UNILEX, English
translation) (PACE, English translation). See their text and the note prepared by
PETER SCHLECHTRIEM, RECHT DER INTERNATIONAL WIRTSCHAFT, 1995, p. 590-94;
see also the translation to Italian and the note by Alessandra Mari in Diritto del
Commercio Internazionale, 1995, n. 19.2, p. 487-501. One must praise the
UNIDROIT Principles for ruling on the rate of interests, a ruling that could not be
obtained during the drafting of the Vienna Convention. The drafters of the Con-
vention were unable to find a compromise acceptable to them. For this reason, rate
of interest is an open question under the Convention; its solution is unclear: on the
basis of the general principles of the Convention (Article 7(2) CISG) or, on the
contrary, a matter that must be solved under the rules of the private international
law. Finally, the first arbitral award that identified the UNIDROIT Principles
with the principles on which the Convention is based is: ICC 8128/1995, (applying
UNIDROIT Principles and the European Principles of Contract Law to determine
the rate of interest). The Principles of European Contract Law, which should be
approved soon in their final form, are the product of the work of the Commission on
European Contract Law under the chairmanship of Professor Ole Lando. They are
similar to the UNIDROIT Principle but its field of application, rationae materiae,
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol10/iss1/5
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are silent about them.2 1 In the context of the three texts con-
sidered: the CISG, the UCC, and the UNIDROIT Principles,
this article analyzes the fact pattern that is the object of this
present study: the battle of the forms.
is broader (consumer contracts as well as commercial contracts). However, the con-
cept internationally is narrower, since the European Principles are intended to
apply within the scope of the European Union States. See Michael Joachim Bonnel,
The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts and the Princi-
ples of European Contract Law: Similar Rules for the Same Purposes, 2 UNIF. L.
REV. 229 (1996); and Katharina Boele-Woelki, The UNIDROIT Principles of Inter-
national Commercial Contracts and the Principles of European Contract Law: How
to Apply Them to International Contracts, 4 UNIF. L. REV. 652 (1996). See infra n.
21 for the method of citing case law.
21 Presently, the best way of finding a case dealing with the CISG is through
the computer.
-CISG W3 Database of the Institute of International Commercial Law of Pace Uni-
versity School of Law (White Plains-New York) <http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu>.
Editors: Professors Albert H. Kritzer and Nicholas Triffin [hereinafter PACEI.
- UNILEX (International Case Law and Bibliography on the UN Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods) is published by Transnational Pub-
lishers, Inc. One Bridge Street, Irvington, New York 10533. Phone (914) 591-4288
(orders 800-914-8186). UNILEX is available in paper, CD-Rom, and disk. Director:
Professor Michael-Joachim Bonell.
- CLOUT (Case Law on Uncitral Texts) is the system UNCITRAL has choosen to
collect all decisions either courts or arbitrators related to any of the texts for this
organism prepared (http://www.un.or.at/ uncitral/status).
- Freiburg University Database (Rabel Website) <http://www.jura.uni-freiburg.de/
iprl/cisg>. Director: Professor Peter Schlechtriem.
- CISG-France, Saarbriicken University <http://www.jura.uni-sb.de/FB/LS/Witz>.
Director: Professor Claude Witz.
The way this author cites a case would be: name of the court, date, docket
number, country, and the source either (PACE) or (UNILEX) or both. In relation
with PACE, it has links to both Freiburg and CISG-France when they provide the
full text of the case at hand, so I will not refer to them. PACE provides also the
CLOUT abstracts, so therefore I will not refer to CLOUT either.
For those who prefer books, see MICHAEL WILL, UNILEX, INTERNATIONAL
SALES LAw UNDER CISG. The UN Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods (1980), The First 222 or so Decisions; Schriftenreihe deutscher Jura-
Studenten in Genf 10, Genbve: Unit6 de droit allemand, Faculte de droit, 1995;
and CLAUDE WITZ, Les premieres applications jurisprudentielles du droit uniforme
de la vente internationale (Convention des Nations Unies du 11 avril 1980). Paris:
LGDJ, 1995. For an English digest of the latter text, see Vivian G. Curran, The
Interpretative Challenge to Uniformity, 15 J. of L & CoM. 175 (1996).
For case law under ULF see Peter Schlechtriem and Ulrich Magnus, Interna-
tionale Rechtsprechung zu EKG un EAG. En Gesellschaft ffir Rechtsvergleichung
(Hrsg.), Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1987. The cases cited in relation with the ULF come
from the cited source.
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II. "BATTLE OF THE FORMS" METHODS OF FINDING A
SOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT BETWEEN CLAUSES
There are two general categories of "battle-of-the-forms"
transactions. One category, where thousands of transactions
proceed satisfactorily despite unresolved conflicts in their
terms22 and alternatively, a dramatically smaller number of
such transactions in which the conflict is resolved under an ap-
plicable legal regime.
Litigation of conflicts between clauses contained in forms
that the parties exchange do not arise frequently;23 however,
when they do it can be very difficult to resolve.
The international legal community has not yet found a sat-
isfactory way to decide what terms control in an agreement
22 Battle of the forms are associated with the use of general terms and condi-
tions. This is common place. FRANS VAN DER VELDEN, UNIFORM INTERNATIONAL
SALES LAw AND BATTLE OF FORMS in UNIFICATION 233 (Jean G Sauveplanne eds.,
1984). Conflicts between forms are also commonplace. Such conflicts are inevitable
when parties exchange purchase orders and acceptances, each with its own pre-
printed terms and conditions, under circumstances such as the following:
(1) Each document bears on its face tailored attention to such matter
as price, quantity and delivery.
(2) The "legal" terms and conditions are set forth, often in fine print,
commonly on the reverse side; or in a separate attachment.
(3) The forms are processed by business persons whose salaries are
more perfectly attuned to the volume of such transactions than to the con-
tents of the "legal" terms and conditions.
In such an environment it is hardly surprising that more attention is paid by
such persons to the contents of (l) than to the contents of (2). A consequence is less
attention by such persons to conflicting liability/limitation-of-liability and other
"legal" clauses that can accompany the transaction.
23 Although this is an environment in which unresolved battle-of-the-forms
issues are commonplace, two factors reduce the risk of litigation: first, the typical
purchase and sale transaction is carried forward in a manner satisfactory to both
parties, without regard to the "legal" clauses that accompany the transaction; sec-
ond, where problems arise parties generally resolve them, often also without re-
gard to the "legal" clauses that accompany the transaction. For example, in a study
made over a period of 16 years by IBM Canada, it was found that on the basis of
250 different models of forms, about 18,000 annual sales contracts and about
27,000 purchase contracts -of a total of 90,000 sales and purchase transactions-
there were no instances of conflicts of forms that led to litigation. See G. Murray, A
Corporate Counsel's Perspective of the "Battle of the Forms," THE CANADIAN Bus.
L.J., 1980, vol. 4, n. 13, p. 290-96. A typical business solution is a cost/risk analy-
sis: the cost in man hours (man years in large volume business) of perfectly coordi-
nating the exchanged documents versus the risk entailed by having a proportion of
them pass through with "legal" terms that conflict. See id. This is a risk that can
lead to varying degrees of uncertainty, depending on the legal regime applied: this
is the subject of this analysis.
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when a transaction is consummated on the basis of a routine
exchange of inconsistent forms.24
The battle-of-the-forms problem may be solved in basically
two ways that are dictated by the performance of the contract.
Generally speaking, the two solutions include the application of
either the classical pattern of two declarations of will (offer and
acceptance), or the understanding of formation of a contract
through its performance, even though the content of the con-
tract is incomplete. The conflict between forms creates the ques-
tion: Is there a contract, and what are its terms? There is an
approach that requires perfect identity between the contents of
two declarations of will. Strictly applied, this would lead to the
non-existence of the contract. This approach should be rejected,
however, especially where there are acts of performance that
indicate acceptance to an offer, the existence of a contract, and
its conclusion. One other alternative to resolve battle-of-the-
forms issues is a good faith principle. This results in a neutral
solution, preventing either party from gaining an advantage by
being the first or the last to send a declaration of will.
24 See JOHN 0. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE
1980 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION, 228 (1991). The author refers to dissatisfac-
tion with Section 2-207 UCC. For a comparison of the Vienna Convention and the
UCC, see also his statement that "UCC 2-207 tried to go farther and, in effect,
force through a marriage when the couple is quarreling at the altar. Personally I
think the Convention's restraint is preferable." See also John 0. Honnold, The New
Uniform Law for International Sales and the UCC: A Comparison, Symposium on
International Sale of Goods Convention, THE INTL. LAWYER, 1984, vol. 18, n 11, p.
26. Professor Honnold refers impliedly to the last-shot rule, but in the second edi-
tion of his text clearly rejects it: "Last shot" theories have been rightly criticized as
casuistic and unfair. They do not reflect international consensus that justifies im-
porting them into the Convention. See id. Later, Professor Honnold explains that if
the contract performance shows its existence, but its terms are contradictory, the
solution must be derived from applicable law of commercial sales, which provides
solutions to gaps left in contracts. See id. The author applies the knock-out rule.
See HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW, n. 1170.3, p. 238-39. Professor Farnsworth, referring
as well to the controversy in his country surrounding Section 2-207 UCC, indicates
that the solution provided by the Convention is sensible but conservative. See E.
Allan Farnsworth, Formation of Contracts, in N.M. GALSTON AND H. SMIT, INTER-
NATIONAL SALES: The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods, (1984) 3-17. See also J. Edward Murray, An Essay on the
Formation of Contracts and Related Matters Under the United Nations Convention
on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, THE J. OF L. AND CoM., 40 (1988);
and Barry Nicholas, The Vienna Convention on International Sales Law, 15 L.
QUART. REV. 217 (1989), in whose judgement, the Convention makes a very small
contribution to solve the problem.
1998]
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These two main approaches (offer and acceptance or per-
formance) are based on opposite assumptions: that the parties
read and understand the contents of each other's forms, or that
pre-printed forms are not read. In the latter case, a contract
could be deemed concluded by the existence of an agreement on
the essential terms, even though there remain some terms
which are contradictory. In this way, by the use of flexible stan-
dards, one avoids inconveniences caused by the last-shot rule, a
rule that favors contractual terms of a party who acts last.
Few commentators of the Convention study the conflict of
forms from the perspective of the legislative politic that it pur-
ports to protect. 25 This is important and would prevent, in
some situations, searching for a solution to a conflict through
the dispositions of some Codes, fundamentally to Section 2-207
UCC, 26 or the German legal practice. 27 Those texts have a dif-
25 By way of exception, see ALBERT KRITZER, INTERNATIONAL CONTRACT MAN-
UAL, GUIDE TO PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON
CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS, 117 (1989), who states: "It was
a battle between certainty and equity with the advocates of certainty winning out."
See also Thomas J. McCarthy, Ending the "Battle of the Forms;" a Symposium on
the Revision of Section 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 41 Bus. LAw. 1019,
1063 (1994), who assumes that: "Theoretically, the CISG and the UCC take oppo-
site stances on what constitutes acceptance. The UCC adopts the theory that busi-
ness people rarely read the boilerplate language on purchase forms and that both
parties are relying on the existence of a contract despite their clashing forms. Be-
cause of this view, the UCC allows contract formation unless the responding of-
feree specifically states that there will be no contract until the original offeror
expressly accepts the second set of terms." Id. The American Bar Association, in a
publication related to CISG, recognized that: "Where exchanged forms do not
match, application of the Convention will lead to fewer enforceable contracts be-
cause the terms of an acceptance must conform to those of the offer except where
alterations are not material (Art. 19). Although United Sates law is more flexible in
these matters (UCC 2-207), in international trade where parties are dealing with
each other at a distance, the Convention's greater conceptualism is arguably desir-
able because it will force parties to produce more evidence of a concluded agree-
ment." KRITZER at 173 citing SuMMARY OF PRINCIPLE PROVISIONS OF THE CISG, THE
CONVENTION FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS: A HANDBOOK OF BASIC
MATERIALS, (Katherein & Magraw eds.) 1987.
26 Section 2-207 UCC is based on the assumption that the merchants do not
read and understand the terms contained on the forms exchanged between the
parties. See John E. Murray, The Chaos of the "Battle of the Forms:" Solutions, 39
VAND. L. REV. 1307, 1373 (1986); see also Caroline Brown, Restoring Peace in the
Battle of the Forms: A framework for making Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-
207 work, 69 N.C. L. REV. 893, 902 (1991).
There are many who compare Article 19 CISG with Section 2-207 UCC, calling
attention to malicious results that can be achieved under the former. See, for ex-
ample, Michael Kabik, Through the looking-glass: International Trade in the "won-
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ferent orientation than the Convention, which opted for the ob-
jective of achieving uniform application, certainty, and legal
security. One should not ignore, however, the other option. It is
not a solution to be ignored, although its rejection by the Con-
vention was probably influenced, in large part, by the extensive
criticism that Section 2-207 UCC has received. In our opinion,
as explained in the accompanying analysis, there are more
weighty reasons to support the solution adopted by the Vienna
text. It is not to suggest that the other option is technically in-
derland" of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale
of Goods, 9 INr'L TAX & Bus. LAW. 418 (1992); See also Carl Kelso, The United
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: Contract For-
mation and the Battle of the Forms, 21 COLUM. J. TRANSNATL L. 529, 555 (1983),
who indicates that the Convention, unlike the UCC, does not treat the parties
equally; Patrick Thieffry, Sale of Goods between French and U.S. Merchants:
Choice of Law Considerations under the U.N. Convention on Contracts for the In-
ternational Sale of Goods, 22 INT'L LAw. 1025 (1988). Nevertheless, it is also said
that Article 19 CISG is simpler and easier to apply than Section 2-207 UCC.
27 For German law see § 150(2) BGB ("Eine Annahme unter Erweiterungen,
Einschrdnkungen oder sonstigen Anderungen gilt als Ablehnung verbunden mit
einem neuen Antrage"). This Article, a parallel of Article 19(1) CISG, led to the
application of the last-shot rule. From this doctrine there was an evolution towards
more flexible standards which applied §§ 154 and 155 BGB. For German law and
the new orientations adopted by the courts see Salvador Durany Pich, Sobre la
necesidad de que la aceptaci6n coincida en todo con la oferta: el espejo roto, III
ANUARIO DE DERECHO CIVIL, 1011, 1030 (1992).
Schlechtriem does not try to force the interpretation, although he notes the
inconvenience of the solution adopted by the Convention: "It does not provide a
special rule for the battle of the forms; similar proposals had not any support. Con-
sequently, the problem of the collision of standards terms must be solved in accord-
ance to Article 19 CISG. The application of the BGB solution. . . is not possible,
because the Convention does not contain a regulation of the partial disagreement
of the § §154 and 155 BGB." See PETER SCHLECHTRIEM, ERGANZUNGEN, EIN-
SCHRANKUNGEN UND SONSTIGE ANDERUNGEN ZUM ANGEBOT, Ernst von Caemmerer
& Peter Schlechtriem, Kommentar zum Einheitlichen UN-Kaufrecht. Das tGber-
einkommen der Vereinten Nationen iber Vertraige iber den internationalen
Warenkauf -CISG- Kommentar (1995). The author also states that: "we are afraid
of a results similar to the old case law in Germany that followed the last-shot rule."
Id. This analysis elaborates on the views of German scholars and case law. See id.
SCHLECHTRIEM, nevertheless, indicates that the consequences of the last-shot rule
could be avoided when, from an interpretation of the parties' declarations or con-
duct in accordance with the usages and practices, the existence of agreement could
at least be derived from the essential terms. See id. He also states that the parties
prefer a conclusion of a contract that take this into account. See id. Besides, it
could be deemed a resignation to their opposite general conditions (Art. 6 CISG),




PACE INT'L L. REV.
correct or an option legally perverse;28 on the contrary, it is ade-
quate to protect the specific interests that a legal system seeks
to preserve. It is a well accepted position, and moreover, a legal
norm, that forms are often ignored. It is also valid, however, to
support the opposite theory. Therefore, the Convention sought
to encourage, by means of a legal disposition, the reading of the
forms and the discussion of the contract clauses: purposes that
the Vienna legislators clearly wanted to protect.
The accompanying analysis explores, in detail, the process
used to solve battle-of-the-forms issues.
The first section reveals the methods used to introduce gen-
eral conditions to the content of a contract (infra III). The next
section surveys the principal criticisms of applying offer and ac-
ceptance rules to the battles-of-the-forms (infra IV). Section
Five examines Sec. 2-207 UCC as an example of a legal regime
which applies the control of contents to resolve the conflict be-
tween clauses (infra V.A), as well as the solution adopted by the
UNIDROIT Principles (infra V.B). The final section studies the
rules of the Vienna Convention (infra VI) and concludes with
the solution regarded as most appropriate.
III. GENERAL CONDITIONS AS PART OF THE CONTRACT
Although the Vienna Convention has no express rule on
making general conditions a part of an agreement, guidance is
provided in its rules on autonomy of the parties (Article 6), the
determination of the intent of the parties (Article 8), and on the
significance of usages and practices (Article 9).
We have for many years become accustomed to having cer-
tain general conditions as part of a contract through the appli-
cation of INCOTERMS and UCP 500,29 where incorporation by
reference is usually practiced. New technology EDI (Electronic
Data Interchange),30 where incorporation by reference is usu-
28 This is how some authors regard the mirror image rule. The words of Pro-
fessor Murray are clear enough, see Murray, supra note 24, at 1331, comparing the
mirror image rule of the Common Law and Section 2-207(3) UCC: "The unjust
result (referring to the last-shot rule) became a just result under 2-207 UCC." Id.
29 INCOTERMS (International Commercial Terms) and the Uniform Rules on
Documentary Credits.
30 We are referring to a system that consists of the data interchange between
computers in a format previously agreed to by the parties. It is the most modem
way of communication. The use of a net that connects the computers is a normal
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ally practiced adds to the importance of this subject.31 In every
practice in the banking field. There have been many efforts by international and
national organizations to achieve standardization in the use of the EDI messages.
See Amelia H. Boss, Electronic Data Interchange Agreements: Private Contracting
Toward a Global Environment, 13 N.W. J. INT'L L. 31 (1992); and Rob VanEsch,
Interchange Agreements, 1 EDI L. REV. 3 (1994).
In the USA, since 1989, there has been a model of EDI for international trans-
actions, developed by a task force of the American Bar Association. See Model
Electronic Data Interchange Agreement, which has a comment prepared for The
Electronic Messaging Services Task Force, Subcommittee on Electronic Commercial
Practices Uniform Commercial Code Committee Section of Business Law; See
Michael S. Baum & Amelia H. Boss, The Commercial Use of Electronic Data In-
terchange- A Report and Model Trading Partner Agreement, 45 Bus. LAW. 1645
(1990). This Article contains the text of the Agreement (ABA Agreement) and the
comment (p.1718-49). Also, an EDI Agreement has been prepared by the "United
Kingdom EDI Association," which in sixteen Articles regulates the more relevant
questions connected with this modern way of communication. For the text of this
agreement, see EDI Association, Standard Electronic Data Interchange Agreement,
6 COMPUTER L.J. 65 (1989).
In the international arena, we should mention the efforts of the United Na-
tions Commission for Europe that has developed the standard UN/EDIFACT
("Electronic Data Interchange for Administration, Commerce and Transport"). In
the field of the European Commission, since 1987 there is a program known as
TEDIS "Trade Electronic Data Interchange Systems." Lastly, the International
Chamber of Commerce has published the "Uniform Rules for Conduct for Interna-
tional Trade Data by Teletransmission (UNCID)."
31 Especially important is the recent work of UNCITRAL: 1996 UNCITRAL
Model Law on Electronic Commerce. For the reports on this work at the various
sessions: See also Agustin Madrid Parra, EDI (Electronic Data Interchange): Es-
tado de la cuesti6n en UNCITRAL. Revista de Derecho Mercantil, 115-149 (1993);
and Agustin Madrid Parra, Anterproyecto de la Ley Modelo sobre aspestosjuridicos
del intercambio electronico de datos 2065 Estudios de Derecho Mercantil en
Homenaje al Professor Manuel Broseta Pont Tomo II. (Valencia: Tirant lo blanch,
1995). Specifically, the Working Group on Electronic Data Interchange of UNCI-
TRAL decided to take into account two proposals -from the ICC and The United
Kingdom- concerning incorporation by reference of the standard clauses of a data
message. See, respectively, in the Spanish text: "Propuesta del observador de la
CCI", A/CN.9/WG.IV/WP.65, 6 enero 1995; and "la Propuesta del Reino Unido de
Gran Bretafia e Irlanda del Norte," A/CN.9/WG.IV/WP.66, 23 enero 1995. Thanks
to the interest aroused by those proposals, it was decided that the solutions, in
relation to incorporation by reference, should be collected in the Draft Guide for
the incorporation of the Model Law on EDI to domestic law, which is now being
prepared. See the Spanish document: "Informe del Grupo de Trabajo sobre inter-
cambio electr6nico de datos acerca de la labor de su 291 perfodo de sesiones,"
(Nueva York, 27 de febrero a 10 de marzo de 1995). A/CN.9/407, 16 marzo de 1995,
pfo. 103.
The structure of a data message can aggravate the problem of the incorpora-
tion by reference of general conditions. We encounter situations in which a previ-
ous agreement exists and where the general conditions are collected (situations
that ought not to present problems) and situations in which there was no previous
agreement and no general conditions were previously collected. In this sense, see
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case, the incorporation by reference must be express or implied;
and where implied, it must be derived from usages or from prac-
tices established between the parties. 32 It is assumed that
three ways exist to incorporate general conditions into the con-
tract: 1) by an exchange between the parties (Articles 14(1) and
18(1) CISG),33 that is to say, the conditions are recited in a form
also LIEVE ELIAS, JACQUES GERARD AND GIEN Kuo WANG, LE DROIT DES OBLIGA-
TIONS FACE Aux EXCHANGES DE DONEES INFORMATISEES 48, Cashiers du Centre de
Recherches Informatique et Droit. (Paris: Facult~s Universitaires Notre-Dame de
la Praix de Namur, Story scientia, 1992). Article 3.1 of the Model of Electronic
Data Interchange Trading Partner Agreement offers parties three options to regu-
late the content of the agreement.
32 For this reason we agree completely with BURGHARD PILTZ, UN-
KAUFRECHT, IN VON WESTPHALEN. HANDBUCH DES KAUFFVERTRAGSRECHT IN DEN
EG-STAATEN 23 (Verlag Ko1n: Dr. Otto Schmidt 1992); commentary 3 to Article
2.19 of the UNIDROIT Principles, and with MICHAEL JOACHIM BONELL, "POLICING"
THE CONTRACT AGAINST UNFAIRNESS UNDER THE UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES FOR IN-
TERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS 255, (Diritto del Commercio Internazionale
1994).
Some scholars of the Convention - with whom we are in accord - consider
that actual knowledge (however, when art. 9.2 comes into play, implied knowledge
is sufficient) of the parties is essential (it would not be valid acceptance of the
conditions by silence or inaction) in the interest of uniformity. See Ulrich Drobnig,
Standard Forms and General Conditions in International Trade; Dutch, German,
and Uniform Law, HAGUE-ZAGREB ESSAYS 4, ON THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
TRADE, 123 (1983), who refers to the 1964 ULF. See also Peter Sarcevic,
Stamdards Forms and General Conditions, HAGUE-ZAGREB ESSAYS 4, ON THE LAW
OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE, 135, (1983) and Herbert Asam, Aktuelle Fragen zur
Anwendung des Kaufrechtsubereinkommens der Vereinten Nationen vom 10.4.80
im Deutsch-italienischen Rechtsverkehr seit 1.1.88, JAHRBUCH FUR ITALIENISCHES
RECHT 18-19 (1990). This doctrine is also supported by Marinus Vroman, Imple-
mentation of Treaties and use of Standard Terms in Dutch Law concerning the
International Sale of Goods, SURVEY OF THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 57
(Lafili, et al. eds.) (1986). It is considered, lastly, to be a question of validity,
which must be left to the rules of the international private law, (see YVES DERAINS
AND JAQUES GHESTIN, LA CONVENTION DE VIENNE SuR LA VENTE INTERNATIONALE
ET LES INCOTERMS 65 (1990)) or a pending unresolved question. See ELIZABETH
STERN, ERKLARUNGEN IM UNCITRAL-KAUFRECHT 50 (1990).
The Spanish domestic doctrine equates the possibility of having conditions
known and effective knowledge (See MANUEL ALBALADEJO, DERECHO CIVIL, ToMo I.
INTRODUCCION Y PARTE GENERAL, 413 (Barcelona: Bosch 11 ed.) (1991); and JAMIE
SANTOS Bmiz, DERECHO CIVIL, TEORIA Y PRACTICA, ToMo III. DERECHO DE OBLIGA-
CIONES, LA OBLIGACION Y EL CONTRATO EN GENERAL, DERECHO DE DAtOS 279.
(1973)), commenting on the express dispositions of the Italian Civil Code Articles
1341 and 1342; See also an excellent analysis of these dispositions by Gino Gorla,
Standard Conditions and Form Contracts in Italian Law, 11 AM. J.CoMP.L. 1
(1962).
33 Article 18(1) states: "A statement made by or other conduct of the offeree
indicating assent to an offer is an acceptance. Silence or inactivity does not itself
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that serves as an offer or an acceptance or that is enclosed with
either declaration; 2) by the practices or previous negotiations
established between the parties (Articles 8(3) and 9(1) CISG);34
a clear example is where a party sends a document in which
general conditions are reproduced and later, in the offer or the
acceptance, there is a suitable reference to them; 3) finally,
there can be general conditions which reflect a usage of trade of
the kind described in Article 9(2) CISG.35
In each case, the general conditions must be incorporated
expressly (or impliedly, as stated before) and previously or at
least at the time of the conclusion of the contract.
36
amount to an acceptance." See also Tribunal Commercial de Nivelles, 19 Septem-
ber 1995 (R.G. 1707/93) (Belgium) (PACE) (UNILEX).
34 Paragraph 3 of Article 8 states: "In determining the intent of a party or the
understanding a reasonable person would have had, due consideration is to be
given to all relevant circumstances of the case including the negotiations, any
practices which the parties have established between themselves, usages and any
subsequent conduct of the parties."
Article 9(1) provides: "The parties are bound by any usage to which they have
agreed and by any practices which they have established between themselves."
35 Article 9(2) states: "The parties are considered, unless otherwise agreed, to
have impliedly made applicable to their contract or its formation a usage of which
the parties knew or ought to have known and which in international trade is
widely known to, and regularly observed by, parties to contracts of the type in-
volved in the particular trade concerned." See also Gerechtshofs Hertogenbosch,
24 April 1996 (456/95/He) (Netherlands) (PACE) (UNILEX).
36 See Henning Stahl, Standard Business Conditions in Germany under the
Vienna Convention, COMP. Y.B. INTL'L Bus. 383, (1993); ROLF HERBER & BEATE
CZERVENKA, INTERNATIONALES KAUFRECHT, Kommentar zu dem tMbereinkommen
der Vereinten Nationen vom 11 April 1980, uber den internationalen Warenkauf
75 (1991); PETER SCH-LECHTRIEM, Begriff des Angebots, in KOMMENTAR ZUM
EINHEITLICHEN UN KAUFRECH 138 (1995); and Walter A. Stoffel, Formation du
Contrat. In the 1980 Vienna Convention on the International Sale of Goods 73. Lau-
sanne Colloquium of November 19-20, 1984. (Institut Suisse de Droit Compar6 (3),
Zurich: Schulthess Polygraphischer) (1985).
It is interesting to observe that the following language was proposed during
deliberations on the text of the CISG: "General conditions of sale referred to in the
offer which are attached to it or known to the offeree or widely known in the inter-
national trade are considered to be a part of the contract if the offeree agrees they
are to be applied. The terms of the contract prevail if they differ from the general
conditions of sale." This proposal was rejected because the Convention Draft al-
ready had rules to determine the content of the contract. See IX Yearbook 1978 (A/
CN.9/142), n1276-278, p.81. See also HONNOLD, supra note 22, at 299.
For a comparison with the ULF in regard to inclusion of general conditions in
an invoice, see Hof den Haag, 25 January 1984 (Netherlands) (in appelation: Der
Hoge Raad, 18 October 1985); for a ULF comparison relating to signature on a
form as a conclusive acceptance, see LG Heidelberg, 30 January 1979 (0 4/78 kfHI)
(Germany) and OLG Koblenz, 23 December 1983 (2 U 1186/83) (Germany).
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IV. THE BATTLE OF THE FORMS SOLUTION IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE RULES OF OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE: OBJECTIONS
TO THE LAST SHOT DOCTRINE
Following are two illustrative applications of the rules of
offer and acceptance and the last-shot doctrine. First, buyer
sends seller his form (offer to buy); seller replies with his form
which contains material modifications (counter-offer); seller dis-
patches the goods which are received and accepted by buyer.
This acceptance of goods is regarded as an acceptance by the
buyer of the terms contained in seller's form. Second, seller
makes an offer to sell by sending his own form; buyer replies
with his form which contains material modifications (counter-
offer); seller dispatches the goods. This dispatch of goods is re-
garded as an acceptance by the seller of the terms contained in
buyer's form.
A question always present is whether the inclusion of gen-
eral conditions in the reply to the offer is, by itself, a material
modification. 37 Each case must be examined in the context of
the transaction by comparison of the reply to the offer and the
terms of the offer.38
A fundamental question is whether a valid conclusion of a
contract can be assumed when the forms exchanged contain in-
compatible or contradictory terms. The answer, in accordance
with the offer-acceptance pattern (last-shot doctrine), is clear:
the contract is concluded, either when one party, by express
declaration, accepts the form sent by the other party (an excep-
37 See STOFFEL, supra note 34, at 74, who indicates that generally an accept-
ance with different general conditions will be a counter-offer; See also BURGHARD
PILTZ, INTERNATIONALES KAUFRECHT 98. (1980)(1993), KRITZER, supra note 23, at
182; and ULRICH VON HUBER, Der Uncitral-Entwurf eines Ubereinkommens iiber
Internationale Warenkaufvertrge, RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT 444 (1979). To the same
effect, see Landgericht (LG) Landshut, 14 June 1976 (hk o 135/75) (Germany),
judging Article 7(1) ULF. But see Rechtbank Arnhem, 23 December 1982 (rolnr
1979/1761) (Netherlands), where the court has ruled that an offer by a Holland
buyer is not materially modified when the Belgian seller accepts referring to his
general conditions.
But see FRuz BYDLINSKI, DAS ALLGEMEINES VERTRAGSRECHT, P. Doralt ed.,
Das Uncitral-Kaufrecht im Vergleich zum Osterreichischen Recht, 72, (1985); and
SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 25, at 19.
38 Often the situation is complicated by multiple, communications multiple
exchanges by the cross of different communications and notifications (verbally or
by writing). The problem is better confronted by starting with a simple situation.
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tional case) or when there is a suitable act of performance by
the recipient of the counter-offer in accordance with (Art.18(1)
or (3)39 read in conjunction with Art.19 CISG).40
39 Article 18:
"(1) A statement made by or other conduct of the offeree indicating assent
to an offer is an acceptance. Silence or inactivity does not itself amount to
an acceptance.
(3) However, if, by virtue of the offer or as a result of practices which the
parties have established between themselves or of usage, the offeree may
indicate assent by performing an act, such as one relating to the dispatch
of the goods or payment of the price, without notice to the offeror, the
acceptance is effective at the moment the act is performed, provided that
the act is performed within the period of time laid down in the preceeding
paragraph."
40 Analysis of the offer-acceptance-counter-offer pattern is provided by numer-
ous commentators on the Convention. There are some differences in their opinions
which will be indicated. See generally SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 25, at 120. See
also KATHARINA S. LUDWIG, Der Vertragsschluss nach UN-Kaufrecht im Span-
nungsverhhltnis von Common Law und Civil Law: dargestellt auf der Grundlage
der Rechtsordnungne Englands und Deutschlands, Studien zum vergleichenden
und internationalen Recht-Comparative and International Law Studies, Band 24,
Frankfurt am Main, Berlin, New York, Paris, and Wien: Peter Lang, 1994, p. 339-
40; KARL NEUMAYER, Das Wiener Kaufrechts-tbereinkommen und die sogennante
'tattle of the forms," In Freiheit und Zwang: rechtliche, wirtschaftliche und gesell-
schaftliche Aspekte. Fetschrift zum 60. Geburstag von Hans Giger, Bern: Stdmpfli,
512, 1989; KARL NEUMAYER AND CATHERINE MING, Convention de Vienne sur les
contrats de vente internationale de marchandises. Lausanne: Cedidac, 184, 1993,
who reject the "knock out" solution; MURRAY, supra note 22, at 38; VELDEN, supra
note 20, at 236 et seq; KRITZER, supra note 23, at 117 et seq; TERRY KAAN, "Stan-
dard Term Contracts," In Singapore Conferences on International Business Law,
Conference VI: Current Developments in International Transfers of Goods and
Services (9-11 September 1992). Organized by: Faculty of Law, National Univer-
sity of Singapore, p. 28 et seq; Paul c. Blodgett, The U.N. Convention on the Sale of
Goods and the "Battle of the Forms," THE COLORADO LAWYER, 1989, Vol. 18, n. 13, p.
425 et seq; FRITZ ENDERLEIN AND DIETRICH MASKOW, INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW:
UNITED CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE
OF GOODS, 101, (1992); BURT A. LEETE, Contract Formation under the United Na-
tions Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods and the Uniform
Commercial Code: Pitfalls for the Unwary, Temple Intl. and Comp. L. J., 1992,
vol.6, n12, pp.208-15; ROLAND LOEWE, Internationales Kaufrecht. Wien: Manz, 44,
1989; HERBER AND CZERWENKA, supra note 34, at 107, n. 118; JOSEPH M. LOOKOF-
SKY, THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNA-
TIONAL SALE OF GOODS, International Encyclopedia of Laws, 58 (1993); and John
A. Spanogle, The Arrival of International Private Law, THE GEORGE WASHINGTON
J. OF INTL. L. AND ECON., 513, n. 124-25, (1991). In studying non-conformity of the
goods under the Convention and the UCC, Schlechtriem expresses concern over
the application of the last-shot doctrine, because in his opinion, clauses limiting
liability will be seldom known by the buyer until the dispute arises. PETER
SCHLECHTRIEM, Einheitliches Kaufrecht und Nationales Obligationenrecht, Baden-
Baden: Nomos, 312 et seq. (1987). Nevertheless, he thinks that the result could be
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The last shot method of solving battle-of-the-forms issues
has been subject to wide criticism, including the following:
A) It is an arbitrary solution because it tends to favor the
last person who sends his form
Application of the "offer-acceptance-counter-offer" last shot
doctrine is criticized because it is said to favor the seller. Con-
sider the following scenario: The buyer (offeror) sends his form
(e.g., a purchaser order) to the seller (the offeree in this case)
who responds with his own form (e.g., an acceptance form),
which in all likelihood contains clauses that contradict stipula-
tions in buyer's purchase order. These contradictory clauses are
deemed accepted at the time buyer accepts the goods sent by the
counter-offeror (the seller). Under this scenario, by applying the
last shot doctrine, the contract is concluded by an act of per-
formance (buyer's acceptance of the goods) and the terms that
will control the content of the contract will be those of the
counter-offer or the seller's form.41
ameliorated, even though he indicates his doubts, by an strict interpretation of
Article 35(2) CISG phrase: "Except where the parties have agreed otherwise." Id.
The Secretariat Commentary to Article 17 of the Draft Convention of 1978 states:
"If the reply contains a material alteration, the reply would not constitute an accept-
ance but would constitute a counter-offer. If the original offeror responds to his reply
by shipping the goods or paying the price, a contract may eventually be formed by
notice to the original offeree of the shipment or payment. In such a case the terms of
the contract would be those of the counter-offer, including the additional or different
term." (A/CONF.97/19, n. 115, p. 24).
For authors who stress the importance of solutions based on examination of
the facts of each case and provide interpretative guides for the conduct of such
examinations, see JEAN THiEFFRY AND CHANTAL GRANIER, LA VENTA INTERNA-
cIONAL, Madrid: ICEX, 75, (1989); and MANUEL MEDINA DE LEMUS, LA VENTA IN-
TERNACIONAL DE MERADERIAS, Madrid: Tecnos, 81, (1992).
41 This objection to the last-shot rule is insistently repeated by its detractors,
especially by U.S. authors, for whom this defect of the last-shot rule has been over-
come by the more innovative rule of Section 2-207 UCC. See the critics of SAMUEL
WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, p. 133 et. seq. n. 16.17 (40 ed.
1990); Brown, supra note 24, at 901, and MUmRAY, supra note 24, at 1331. See also
J. EDWARD MURRAY, ON CONTRACTS, 163 (3rd ed. 1990). For U.S. scholars who
have written on the Convention, see J. Edward Murray, "An Essay," supra note 22,
at 39; See also Christine Moccia, The United Nations Convention on Contracts for
the International Sale of Goods and the "Battle of the Forms," FORDHAM INTL. L. J.
650, 657 and 659; See also PICH, supra note 25, at 1017-19. For Spanish scholars
see Jesus Alfaro, Las Condiciones Generales de la Contrataci6n, Madrid: Civitas,
278, 1991.
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There are two aspects to the criticism of this result: a) the fa-
vored protection given to the party who sends its form last, ordi-
narily the seller; and b) the vulnerable position of the buyer; if
the seller does not send the goods the contract will not be con-
cluded, while if buyer accepts the goods, he will have impliedly
accepted the terms contained in the seller's form.
B) There can be bad faith ramifications
Consider the intended sale and purchase of a commodity in
a price-volatile market. Forms exchanged which are materially
inconsistent because either a term is added to the offer or there
is a limitation upon a term contained in the offer, results in an
application of the mirror-image rule (Article 19(1) CISG) under
circumstances in which the primary objective of the party ap-
plying this rule is to escape the consequences of a change in
market conditions.4 2
C) The results of the rule are too mechanistic and formal
It has been said that the comparison between forms may
produce in judges and arbitrators a kind of apathy in searching
for solutions that may mitigate the rigidity of the mirror image
rule. This criticism, however, is unfounded since case law illus-
trates that the opposite is true. Proof of this is found in the ju-
risprudential evolution of case law in countries such as France
and Germany, as well as Spain. Although, initially, there was a
rigid application of the rule, it has finally been relaxed suffi-
ciently to allow a difference between material and non-material
42 This criticism of the Vienna Convention, as well as of domestic law, is
unanimous among scholars who argue against the last-shot rule. See WILLISTON,
supra note 39, at 134; and David Slawson, The New Meaning of Contract: The
Transformation of Contracts Law by Standard Forms, 46 U. OF PITT. L. REV. 58
(1984); and MURRAY, supra note 22, at 43, who indicates that the right to object
to non-material alterations that is permitted by Article 19(2) CISG allows the of-
feror to escape from a contract when in fact the non-material alterations would not
effect the contract or the offeror. For this reason, he concludes that Article 19
CISG is not only objectively absurd, but also creates contradictions in the Conven-
tion. See id.
Apart from rapid variations in price, there are also other circumstances in
which it is possible to use Article 19 CISG in bad faith. See id.
19981
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terms. 43 This new direction of the mirror-image rule seems to be
forgotten by its opponents.
D) It favors the ping-pong effect
A positive effect of the last-shot rule is it generally permits
easy application in practice as a result of the willingness of both
parties to recognize which declaration was the last one and,
therefore, controls the contract terms. This, however, leads to a
"ping-pong" type effect because each party, knowing the effect of
the rule, can try, by all means, to have its form be the final
form, thereby increasing the already burdensome volume of pa-
per work that flows between the parties.
Such behavior -more appropriate in a tennis game than in
real business- is anti-economical and places more of a premium
on routines (matter of form) than business realities (matters of
substance).
V. THE KNOCK-OUT RULE: SECTION 2-207 UCC AND ARTICLE
2.22 OF THE UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES
Section 2-207 UCC and Article 2.22 of the UNIDROIT Prin-
ciples both try to solve the conflict between clauses based on the
assumption that contract forms are not read by the parties.
Both provisions attempt to overcome the inconvenience and the
rigidity of the mirror-image rule and the last-shot doctrine.
Both provisions are regarded as having a neutral effect
since both mandate that neither party can impose clauses that,
being contradictory, have not been agreed upon. The
UNIDROIT Principles and the U.C.C. adopt a knock-out ap-
proach, with the UCC's variant more difficult to understand
and apply. Both the Principles and the UCC seek to enforce
clauses in exchanged terms and conditions that do not contra-
dict one another, as does the Vienna Convention. Where there
are "material" differences, however, their approach differs from
that of the Convention. For example, if the inspection clauses
contained in buyer's and seller's terms and conditions are iden-
tical in almost all aspects, but contain a difference that is re-
43 In this sense, it has been said that the mirror-image rule exists only in text
books: See Douglas Baird and Robert Wiesberg, Rules, Standards, and the Battle of
the Forms: A Reassessment of 2-207, 68 VA L. REv. 1233, (1982).
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garded as material, the intent of the Convention is to enforce
either the buyer's version or the seller's version, whereas under
the UCC and the Principles, the intent is to enforce neither.
Under the Principles and the UCC, the conflicting terms of the
seller's version and the buyer's version are knocked-out; and a
new version of the clause is substituted as derived from the ap-
plicable governing law.
There are artificialities associated with both the knock-out
rule and the last-shot doctrine. Because it does not enforce
solely the last-shot, the knock-out rule is a neutral approach,
but it can at times significantly undermine the intention of the
parties and the bargain it is intended to strike.
1. Notice of non-conformity example
Assume a conflict between clauses: one states that the pe-
riod to give notice for the lack of conformity of the goods is two
months, the other indicates that the period is two months and
fifteen days. When one applies the knock-out rule, the contradic-
tory clauses cancel each other and the notice rule under a do-
mestic regime is therefore substituted. Under many regimes the
statutory notice period can be much shorter than the period pro-
vided in either of these clauses. For example, the Spanish Com-
mercial Code provides for only a 4-day notice period (art. 336
Spanish Commercial Code, for apparent defects). Such an appli-
cation of the "neutral" knock-out rule would seem to go against
the will of both parties.
Under the Vienna Convention, the notice period recited in
Article 39.1 is a "reasonable time." Even so, many courts have
construed this narrowly.44 Thus, even under a regime that calls
for notice within it could lead to unfair results.
44 See LG Minchen, 3 July 1989 (17 HKO 3726/89) (Germany) (PACE, Eng-
lish translation) (UNILEX): a notification of the lack of conformity of textiles made
8 days after delivery was made in a reasonable time; See also LG Stuttgart, 31
August 1989 (3 kfh 0 97/89) (Germany) (PACE, English translation) (UNILEX): a
notification made after 16 days after delivery of shoes was declared unreasonable;
ICC n15713, 1989 (PACE) (UNILEX): a notification 8 days after the publication of
the report of the inspection of goods by an independent enterprise was deemed
reasonable; LG Aachen, 3 April 1990 (41 0 198/89) (Germany) (PACE) (UNILEX):
notice of the lack of conformity of shoes made the day following of the reception
and inspection of the goods was deemed reasonable; Rechtbank Dordrecht, 21 No-
vember 1990 (2762/1989) (Netherlands) (PACE) (UNILEX): notice of lack of con-
formity of textiles 15 months after delivery was unreasonable; Rechtbank
1998]
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2. Arbitration example
Consider a case where the both parties agree to arbitration
but each has a different arbitration clause, perhaps with dis-
crepancies as to the place where the process will take place or
other circumstances relative to the arbitration. In this case, it
seems clear that from a strict application of the knock-out rule,
the dispute would be tried before national courts.45
Roermond, 19 December 1991 (900336) (Netherlands) (PACE) (UNILEX): it was
deemed that the notice of the existence of maggots on cheese must be as short as
possible notify to the seller, since it is a perishable good; Pretore della Giurisdi-
zione di Locarno-Campagna, 27 April 1992 (n1652) (Switzerland) (PACE)
(UNILEX): on the basis of the existence of an evident defect in the furniture sold,
buyer had the obligation to inspect and give notice of the lack of conformity at the
same time of the delivery; LG Berlin, 16 September 1992 (99 0 29/92) (Germany)
(PACE) (UNILEX): two months after the delivery of the shoes was not reasonable.
See also LG Berlin, 30 September 1992 (99 0 123/92) (Germany) (PACE)
(UNILEX); Oberlandesgericht (OLG) Disseldorf, 8 January 1993 (17 U 82/93)
(Germany) (PACE, English translation) (UNILEX): notice 7 days after the delivery
of fresh cucumbers was unreasonable; Rechtbank Roerdmond, 6 May 1993
(920150) (Netherlands) (PACE) (UNILEX): 3 months in a sales contract of electric
machines was deemed irreasonable.
But see OLG Innsbruck, 1 June 1994 (4 R 161/94) (Austria) (PACE) (UNILEX):
two months for notifying the lack of conformity of flowers was considered reason-
able; Cour d'Appel de Grenoble, 13 September 1995 (France) (PACE) (UNILEX): a
month for notifying the lack of conformity of cheese was considered reasonable;
Amtsgericht Augsburg, 29 January 1996 (Germany) (PACE) (UNILEX): the period
for notifying the lack of conformity in the case of seasonable goods is a month (in
the case at hand were shoes) (on the contrary, it has been stated that for seasona-
ble goods (in the given case: plastic), the reasonable period of time is 8 days: and
OLG Muinchen, 8 February 1995 (Germany) (PACE) (UNILEX).
It is worth noting that some case law attempts to find a uniform solution (Arti-
cle 7 CISG) by providing, as a compromise between diverse legal systems, that the
reasonable period of time should be no more than a month. (OLG Stuttgart, 21
August 1995 (Germany) (PACE) (UNILEX)): since the buyer either knows of the
defects or ought to have discovered them; (Obergericht Kanton Luzern, 8 January
1997 (Switzerland) (PACE) (UNILEX)): because the delivery of the goods has
occurred.
45 This has happened in a case resolved by United States courts: Lea Tai Tex-
tile Co. v. Manning Fabrics, Inc, 411 F.Supp. 1404 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). Manning's
form indicated that the settlement of a dispute would be held in New York by the
"American Arbitration Association" or by an arbitrator of the textile industry,
whereas Lea Tai, in its form, specified that the arbitration would be conducted in
accordance with the Civil Code of Hong Kong with each party choosing and arbi-
trator. See id. Applying Section 2-207 UCC, the court invalidated the clauses, forc-
ing the parties to resolve their conflict before domestic courts. See id. Comparing
this case with the Convention rules, KELSO, supra note 26, at 554, points out that
the CISG would apply the last-shot doctrine, and consequently, the Lea Tai form
would therefore be regarded as a counter-offer which was accepted by some act of
performance by Manning. See id. However, the application of the rules in Part II
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3. Pricing example
Assume goods are offered at a price lower than customary
market prices, with the lower price arrived at because the goods
are accompanied by a restricted warranty that is phrased differ-
ently in the parties' clauses. This is a case in which an applica-
tion of the knock-out rule that invokes a statutory warranty can
also change the character of the intended bargain. A neutral
knock-out rule may seem to be fair when at times it is not.
These examples illustrate instances in which the last-shot
doctrine -despite its apparent severity- can be preferable to the
knock-out rule; in fact, the apparent severity of the former may
do a better job of calling to the attention of the potentially ag-
grieved parties the importance of resolving, in advance, con-
flicts between competing clauses.
A) Section 2-207 UCC
In Common Law systems, there are major differences in the
resolution of problems caused by discrepancies in conditions
that accompany offers and replies. The English legal system fol-
lows the classic conception of the Common Law, whose bastion
is the mirror image rule.4 6 The United States legal system, on
of the Convention would lead to another result if one took a restrictive interpreta-
tion of the terms listed in Article 19(3) CISG. In other words, an understanding of
the term "settlement of disputes" is limited only to the variations which are di-
rectly related to the solution of disputes related to an arbitration or, to the con-
trary, an ordinary court. For this reason, judging this case under the norms of the
Convention should lead to the following result: Lea Tai's form should not be con-
sidered a counter-offer because it does not vary the terms of the offer concerning
the "settlement of disputes." But it could be deemed an acceptance with non-mate-
rial variations of the terms of the offer relative to the place and the norms of proce-
dure. In this sense, in accordance with Article 19(2) CISG, and taking into account
that there was no objection by the offeror, the terms of the contract will be those of
the offer with the modifications contained in the acceptance. In other words, there
exists an arbitration clause, which assigns the place of arbitration as Hong-Kong.
Therefore, the Rules of the Civil Code of Hong-Kong will be applied and there will
be two arbitrators, one already been chosen by Manning, and one from the "Ameri-
can Arbitration Association" or from the textile industry. However, under either
view, the result would be arbitration rather than litigation of the dispute.
46 Applications have progressed from the traditional rigidity of the mirror-
image rule. See Hyde v. Wrench (England) 49 E.R. 132 (1840) or the more modern
approach of Butler Machine Tool Co. Ltd. v. Ex-Cell-O Corporation (England) Ltd
1All E.R. 965, 1 W.L.R. 401 (1979). Both decisions are cited in English and Ameri-
can commentaries. For the former see G. H. TREITEL, THE LAw OF CONTRACT 19 (
8th ed. 1991); W. R. ANSON, LAw OF CONTRACT 33 (26th ed. 1984); See also the
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the other hand, only partially follows the dictates of the mirror
image rule.47 Under the U.C.C., where there is a conflict
between clauses contained in exchanged terms and condi-
tions, the mirror image rule is displaced by the rule recited
in Section 2-207 UCC.48 This is a somewhat complicated pro-
vision, which creates some contradictions among the
courts.49 Its text is:
analysis of these cases in Pitch, supra note 25, at 1025-29; and Rick Rawlings, The
Battle of Forms, 42 MOD.L.REv. 715-21 (1979).
47 One author, comparing the rules of the Convention on this subject with
those of the UCC, states that the approach followed by the Convention is more
similar to the inflexible rules of the Restatement of Contracts than the flexible cri-
teria adopted by the UCC. See Peter Winship, International Sales Contracts
Under the 1980 Vienna Convention, 17 UCC.L.J. 68(1984). Section 59 Restatement
(Second) of Contracts is equivalent to Article 19(1) CISG; it adopts the principle of
the exact identity in the offer and acceptance terms: "A reply to an offer which
purports to accept it but is conditional on the offeror's assent to terms additional to
or different from those offered is not an acceptance but is a counter-offer." RESTATE-
MENT(SECOND)OF coNTRAcTs 59 (1995).
48 Some believe that Section 2-207 UCC applies only when at least one of the
parties uses a form. See Brown, supra note 24, at 899; others hold that section 2-
207 applies to the formation of a contract in general. See Williston, supra note 39,
at 188. In this way, it is held that the section was conceived to encompass the
entire contract formation process. See John Utz, More on the Battle of the Forms:
The Treatment of "Different" Terms Under the Uniform Commercial Code,
UCC.L.J. 112 (1983). This idea appears to be supported by the legislative history
of the section which, at least intitially, was conceived to resolve the battle of the
forms. See John D. Wladis, UCC Section 2-207: The Drafting History: Ending the
"Battle-of-the-Forms," A Symposium on the Revision of Section 2-207 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code, 49 Bus. LAw. 1029 (1994). For the situation in Canada,
see Morris G. Shanker, Battle of the Forms: A Comparison and Critique of Cana-
dian, American and Historical Common Law Perspectives, 4 CAN. Bus. LAW. J. 263
(1980).
49 In a very ironic way, Marianne M. Jennings, The True Meaning of Rela-
tional Contracts: We Don't Care About the Mailbox Rule, Mirror Images, or Consid-
eration Anymore - Are We Safe? 73 DEN.U.L.REv. 8-9 (1995), points out the
discrepancies among courts in interpreting section 2-207: "Some courts follow the
Montessori playground philosophy of who hit first; that is, if there is a term in the
offer (purchase order) and not in the acceptance, the term comes in as part of the
contract. In states where courts follow this 'me first' Montessori philosophy, all
merchants possess a strong desire to be an offeror. Other courts follow a 'huh-uh,
no sir' philosophy and provide that conflicting terms or terms found in one form
but not in the other, cancel each other out. Still, other courts follow the 'come back
when you agree' philosophy. These courts get into the issue of conditional accept-
ance and from there, dive head-on into the intricacies of section 2-207 and the
realization that section 2-207 applies to additional terms, not different terms. This
brings us to another assemblage of courts that say, 'Look, if these folks can't agree
and their dang forms conflict, toss everything out and rewrite the dang contract for
them."' Id.
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2-207 UCC: (Additional Terms in Acceptance or Confirmation).
"(1) A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written
confirmation which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an
acceptance even though it states terms additional to or different
from those offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance is expressly
made conditional on assent to the additional or different terms.
(2) The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addi-
tion to the contract. Between merchants such terms become part of
the contract unless:
(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer;
(b) they materially alter it; or
(c) notification of objection to them has already been given or is
given within a reasonable time after notice of them is received.
(3) Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a con-
tract is sufficient to establish a contract for sale although the writ-
ings of the parties do not otherwise establish a contract. In such
case the terms of the particular contract consist of those terms on
which the writings of the parties agree, together with any supple-
mentary terms incorporated under any other provisions of this
Act."
UCC 2-207 has not provided the panacea it was intended to
bring. One commentator has stated as follows: "After nearly 40
years of experience with the section, the only thing clear about
the section is that it remains unclear ... a section that raises as
many questions as it answers."50 Another commentator stated:
"The section has become an enigma;" "There should be no doubt
that 'chaos' is an accurate characterization of the state of law in
the 'battle of the forms' arena."51 Its defects derive "partly be-
cause of the numerous situations it was designed to address and
the many more it has been used to address, and partly because
of a judicial reluctance to apply the statute too literally."52
It is a widely accepted view that the mirror image rule
brings more positive effects than the rule established by Section
2-207 UCC.5 3 Against this background, it is not surprising that
50 Williston, supra note 39, at 141-42; and 1 E. ALLA-N FARNSWORTH, ON CON-
TRACTS, 262 (1990).
51 See Brown, supra note 24, at 894; See also Murray, supra note 24, at 1308.
52 Williston, supra note 39, at 142.
53 Baird and Weisberg, supra note 41, at 1222; See also David Vaver, "Battle
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the delegates to the Vienna Diplomatic Conference were reluc-
tant to have the CISG pattern its approach after the UCC. 54 It
is also not a surprise that Section 2-207 UCC is one of the main
scapegoats of the serious consideration that is being given to
revisions to Article 2 UCC. 55
1. Analysis of Section 2-207 UCC
Section 2-207 UCC seeks to have parties avoid escaping ob-
ligations due to incompatibility of the terms and conditions they
exchange. What is considered a counter-offer under the Vienna
Convention as well as most other legal regimes is often treated
as an acceptance under the dictates of Section 2-207 UCC. How-
ever, in spite of the flexibility of this section, it is not so innova-
tive as to allow the contract to be formed without the existence
of the basic element of agreement under all legal systems. This
basic element is the objective manifestation of mutual assent
that is translated into agreement of the parties on the essential
terms, which in the United States is a sufficient description of
the goods and quantity. When an agreement on these elements
exists, the contract is concluded. If the forms are inconsistent in
other respects, the knock-out rule will be applied; coinciding
clauses of the forms will become part of the contract, contradic-
tory clauses are knocked out; and knocked-out terms are sup-
plied by the governing applicable law. The vision which the
UCC follows is that buyers and sellers do not read with suffi-
54 Murray, supra note 22, at 40; See also Andre H. Friedman, The U.N. Con-
vention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Digest of Commercial
Laws of the World, 15 (1988).
55 The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, which
governed the revision of Article 2 UCC, has focused its forces on re-writing Section
2-207 on the basis of two drafts which are examined by Thomas J. McCarthy, An
Introduction: The Commercial Irrelevancy of the "Battle of the Forms," In Ending
the "Battle of the Forms," A Symposium on the Revision of Section 2-207 of the
Uniform Commercial Code. 49 Bus. LAW. 1019-28 (1994); See also Mark E.
Roszkowski and John D. Wladis, Revised U.C.C. Section 2-207: Analysis and Rec-
ommendations. Ending the "Battle of the Forms," A Symposium on the Revision of
Section 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code. 49 Bus. LAw. 1065-80 (1994). See
also Daniel Ostas and Frank Darr, Redrafting U.C.C. Section 2-207: An Economic
Prescription for the Battle of the Forms, 76 DENY. U. L. REV., 419-26 (1996). These
authors examine section 2-207 UCC from an economic point of view. See id. In
their opinion, the future version of section 2-207 UCC must address the following
issues: a) respect for individual autonomy; b) reducing transaction costs; and c)
providing legal stability 410-15. See id.
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cient attention the boilerplate clauses of the forms they re-
ceive.56 The UCC responds to this problem by "knocking-out"
such clauses when they contradict one another.
With the objective of overcoming the last-shot doctrine and,
in the process, changing the traditional balance of power be-
tween the offeror and the offeree, where the offeror is the
master of his offer, 57 the drafters of Section 2-207 UCC regu-
lated three situations. First, conditional acceptances; second,
written confirmations which have an additional term; and, fi-
nally, the battle-of-the-forms. This regulatory scheme answers
the questions of whether a contract exists and, if so, what are
its terms. The UCC approach divorces the formation of the con-
tract from questions relating to its terms, once the basic re-
quirements for the existence of a contract has been satisfied.
2) Rules to determine the existence of the contract
Subsection (1) of Section 2-207 UCC regulates questions
concerning the existence of the contract. It provides the general
rule that a definitive and seasonable expression of acceptance
concludes the contract, even though it contains terms that are
additional or different from the terms offered. The contract is
formed, in this way, avoiding the mirror-image rule (under its
mandate a reply with additional or different terms will not be
considered an acceptance, but rather a counter-offer). Moreover,
the corollary to the mirror-image rule, the last-shot doctrine is
inverted, setting in place a type of first-shot doctrine, to achieve
the neutral composition of the contract, it is often modified us-
ing subsection (3), as a way of escape. 58
56 See id. See also Ostas and Darr, supra note 53, at 413. "[The current 2-
207 creates a perverse incentive to carefully read and consider the fine print on
each and every invoice or purchase order received." Id.
57 Brown, supra note 24, at 897, 904. One of the objectives of Section 2-207
UCC is to refute the mirror-image rule. See id. What she does not say, however, is
that under the last-shot doctrine, the offeror is the master of his offer. See id. This
is because the acceptance, which introduces material modifications, will no longer
be an acceptance, but a new offer, whose terms can be incorporated into the con-
tract by acts of performance which express an intention to accept. See Official Com-
ments 4 and 5, Section 2-207, UCC; See also Murray, supra note 24, at 1360. He
believes that the principal objective of the section is to avoid "oppression and the
unfair surprise." Id.
58 The manner in which this has been handled by the courts has been ques-
tioned by R.W. Duesenberg, Contract Creation: The Continuing Struggle with Ad-
ditional and Different Terms under Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-207, 34
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This general rule comes with an exception,5 9 provided for in
the language after the comma in subsection (1). By this proviso,
a reply to an offer that contains additional or different terms
will not be deemed an acceptance if the reply has been expressly
made conditional upon assent to these additional or different
terms by the offeror. The effect of such a declaration is to invert
the general rule initiated by the section and return to the tradi-
tional rule that regards such a reply as a counter-offer.
This exception has created problems of interpretation par-
ticularly where the language used by the offeree may not be suf-
ficiently clear. One of the first cases which addressed this issue
was Roto-Lith, Ltd v. F.P. Barlett & Co.6 0 In this case, the court
ruled that the reply to the offer modified it so materially that it
was considered a counter-offer. This ruling has been sharply
criticized by virtually every commentator to consider it. It is
said that the Roto-Lith case followed the dictates of the tradi-
tional rule without being able to assimilate the new approach of
Section 2-207 UCC. For this reason, one commentator 61 objects
to Article 19 CISG as it follows this Roto-Lith doctrine, which
U.S. courts have since abandoned. Subsequent U.S. decisions
indicate that for the acceptance to be clearly and expressly
made conditional, it is best to track the language of the
statute. 62
Bus.LAw. 1484 (1979). See also Ostas and Leete, supra note 25, at 381-82, for the
German solution -contradictory terms are changed by usages- which seems
preferable.
59 See Murray, supra note 39, at 172; See also Pitch, supra note 25, at 1043
and Ostas and Darr supra note 53, at 406. The difficulty with section 2-207 (1)
UCC lies in distinguishing a "definite expression of acceptance" from an "expressly
conditional acceptance." Id.
60 See Roto-Lith, Ltd v. F.P. Barlett & Co, 297 F.2d 497 (1st Cir.1962) [here-
inafter Roto-Lith]; see also Murray, supra note 24, at 1330.
61 See Murray, supra note 22, at 41.
62 "Viewing the Subsection (1) provision within the context of the rest of the
rest of that Subsection and within the policies of 2-207 (1) itself, we believe that it
is intended to apply only to an acceptance which clearly reveals that the offeree is
unwilling to proceed with the transaction unless he is assured of the offeror's as-
sent to the additional or different terms therein." Williston, supra note 39, at 239-
40, citing Dorton v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 453 F.2d 1161(6th Cir. 1972), where
the reply to the offer was: "my acceptance is subject to all of the terms and condi-
tions contained within the front and reverse side of it, including the arbitration
clause." The court ruled that this does not satisfy the requirements of Section 2-
207 (1) UCC. See id.
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There are three circumstances in which a definitive decla-
ration of acceptance will not be deemed to exist. The contract
will not be considered concluded under Section 2-207(1) UCC if
the reply to the offer is expressly and clearly made conditional
on assent by the offeror, when the reply may be considered to
alter the offer in a material way;63 or when the reply does not
recognize the intention to conclude a contract in conformity
with Section 2-204 UCC.64 Section 2-207 (2) addresses the sub-
ject of "additional terms" contained in the reply and when such
terms become part of the contract. Section 2-207(2) recognizes
contracts established by acts of performance and concludes with
the UCC's rendition of the knock-out rule: "[Where] the writ-
ings of the parties do not otherwise establish a contract ... the
terms of the particular contract consist of those terms on which
the writings of the parties agree together with any supplemen-
tary terms incorporated under other provisions of this Act."65
For a clause held to conform to the statutory text, see C.Itoh & Co. v. Jordan
Int'l, Co., 552 F.2d 1228 (7h Cir.1977), where the reply to the offer by Jordan,
which introduced an arbitration clause, was as follows: "the acceptance by the
seller . . .is expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or different
terms below indicated and to the preprinted on the reverse side of the document. If
these terms and conditions are not acceptable, the buyer should notify it at once."
Id. The court held that this reply satisfied the requirements of Section 2-207 (1)
UCC, but that the contract could not be deemed concluded according to the dictates
of the subsection. See id. This is because the buyer (Itoh) had not assented to the
seller's terms; nevertheless, the existence of the contract was recognized according
to subsection 3 (knock-out rule): the terms of the contract were derived from the
common terms and the supplementary terms taken from the UCC, excluding the
arbitration clause. See id. For further comments on U.S. law, see Williston, supra
note 39, at 153; Brown, supra note 24, at 917; JOHN D.CALAMARI AND JOSEPH M.
PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 105 (3d ed. 1987); Murray, supra note 24, at
1330, who summarizes the U.S. doctrine; and Pitch, supra note 22, at 1044. One
author has sought to examine the Itoh case under the rules of the Convention; this
analysis gives a different result: Itoh sends his offer to Jordan, who answers with
the clause mentioned above, which includes an arbitration clause. This is a
counter-offer because it introduces a term that materially modifies the offer
(Arts.19(1) and 19(3) CISG). There is a subsequent acceptance of the goods by
Itoh, who accepts the terms of Jordan's counter-offer, therefore the arbitration
clause is deemed to be part of the contract. See id.
63 This process, sometimes referred to as "dickered terms," includes a descrip-
tion of goods, price, quantity and delivery terms.
64 See CALAMARI AND PERILLO, supra note 60, at 108, who, nevertheless, report
the existence of opposite case law.
65 Murray, supra note 39, at 174; JAMES J. WHITE AND ROBERT S. SUMMERS,
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, 42 (3d. ed. 1995). WHITE regards the application of
the knock-out rule as appropriate, since the supplementary rules of the UCC,
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The section 2-207(3) UCC knock-out rule appears to apply
only when the contract could not be deemed concluded in ac-
cordance with subsection (1). This section provides that when
contract conclusion cannot be derived from the forms ex-
changed, but there is subsequent conduct by the parties such as
acts of performance, this will lead to the conclusion that the
contract exists.
Where it is determined that the contract has been con-
cluded, the next fundamental question is what are its terms?
The division of questions over the conclusion of the contract and
the contents of the contract building from the term's agreement
is a logical consequence of the UCC's desire to overcome the in-
convenience of the mirror-image rule and the last-shot doctrine.
Since it is useless to regard a reply to an offer with discrepan-
cies as an acceptance without determining the contents of the
resulting contract, it is necessary to discuss two UCC subsec-
tions which follow UCC 2-207(1).
3. Rules to determine the terms of the contract
a) When the contract has been concluded in accordance with
Section 2-207 (1) UCC
When the contract has been concluded in accordance with
subsection (1) of Section 2-207 UCC, subsection (2),66 provides
us with rules for incorporating in the contract "additional"
terms contained in the reply to an offer. Additional terms are to
be regarded as proposals for additions to the contract which,
subject to three exceptions, automatically become part of the
contract in a transaction between merchants. Subsection (2) is
one of the most difficult parts of section 2-207 UCC to under-
stand, and has aroused much controversy. 67 Subject to subsec-
which are qualified as neutral, will control. See id. SuMMERS, however, points out
that this solution is contrary to the common law, which recognizes acceptance by
conduct. See id.
66 See Baird and Weisberg, supra note 41, at 1244. This subsection was origi-
nally written to regulate the conflicting terms of written confirmations and not to
regulate the battle of the forms. See id. For this reason, the authors state this
subsection has generated much conflict. See id.
67 See Ostas and Darr, supra note 53, at 405-6. The authors point out that:
"Unfortunately, section 2-207(2) contains at least two major difficulties. First, the
subsection gives a strong preference to offerors. A second problem with section 2-
207(2) arises from its silence regarding 'differing' terms." Id.
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tion (2), subsection (1) considers as acceptances declarations
with additional or different terms. 68 Subsection (2), however,
only refers to additional terms, raising questions as to the regu-
lation of an acceptance which has terms different from those
contained in the offer. Whether or not this omission was deliber-
ate is uncertain. 69 The Official Comment on this section seems
to support both views. Comment 3 points in one direction, while
Comment 6 points in another direction, as it neglects to refer to
different terms. Faced with this situation, scholars have devel-
oped conflicting theories that are indistinctly supported by the
case law: a) to include different terms in the regulation of sub-
section (2), so they will become part of the contract; or b) to opt
for the opposite solution and, as a result, different terms will
not be regulated by subsection (2). There then arises the ques-
tion of the regulation of such terms. Professors White and Sum-
mers disagree with one another. White, relying on Official
Comment 6 applies subsection (3) (knock-out-rule). Professor
Summers, on the other hand, holds that Comment 6 refers ex-
clusively to written confirmations. In Summer's opinion, differ-
ent terms in an acceptance are excluded from the contract;70
therefore, the offeror's terms prevail.
68 See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 60, at 104. This distinction between
additional and different terms is difficult to illustrate, as an offeror may include in
his offer not only express terms, but also implied terms. Some subscribe to the
point of view that an added term in the acceptance should be considered as addi-
tional; But see SUMMERS & WHITE, supra note 63, at 36. SUMMERS understands
that the implied terms must be treated as different. See id.; Murray, supra note 24,
at 1361-1362, agrees with SUMMERS. He adds an exception concerning exclusion
of terms by the offer. See Brown, supra note 24, at 932, who indicates that the
comparison between the terms of the forms must be made only by reference to the
express terms of the offer; otherwise, it would be impossible to determine the of-
feror's intention.
69 See Wladis, supra note 46, at 1050. The legislative history of the section is
clear: in subsection (a) the drafters rejected the regulation of different terms. See
id. See also Baird and Weisberg, supra note 41, at 1240; Duesenberg supra note
56, at 1483; and Brown, supra note 24, at 930. But see Murray, supra note 24, at
1358, 1364; Murray, supra note 22, at 178 ; and Utz, supra note 46, at 105. Utz
explains the discrepancy stating: "the present Code contains a critical printer's
omission." Id.
70 See WHITE AND SUMMERS, supra note 63, at 34-35; See also Murray, supra
note 24, at 1354. For support of Professor Summer's view, see CALAmAmi AND PE-
RILLO, supra note 60, at 104-5. See also Official Comments 3 and 6 of Section 2-207
U.C.C. 69-70.
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An analysis of subsections (1) and (2) of Section 2-207
reveals that there are rules for situations; (1) when the offeree
includes in his declaration is an acceptance; and (2) between
merchants require that additional (or different) terms be
deemed part of the contract by mere silence. This conclusion is
derived from the fact that subsection (2)(c) indicates that the
notification of an objection to the inclusion of such terms pre-
vents their automatic incorporation to the contract. Therefore, a
contrario, the mere silence of the offeror means an automatic
acceptance.
The above rules are subject to two exceptions:
1) when the offer expressly limits acceptance to its terms.
The reply to an offer conditioned upon acceptance of all its
terms (subsection (1)) and the offer conditioned upon its total
acceptance (subsection (2) (a)) are not treated the same. In the
first case, the acceptance conditioned in that way is deemed a
counter-offer. Where courts are reluctant to put this under the
scheme of the last-shot rule -the counter-offer is accepted by
acts of performance and the terms of the contract will be those
of the last declaration. They usually turn to the knock-out rule
regulated by subsection (3). In the second case, the additional
(or different) terms of the acceptance are not incorporated in the
contract, so the contract is composed of the terms of the offer,
unless the offeror expressly assents to inclusion of the addi-
tional (or different) terms proposed by the offeree.
2) additional (or different) terms that materially7 1 alter the
offer. The terms are not deemed incorporated in the contract, 72
and vice versa, if the terms are considered non-material, they
become part of the contract. In contrast with Article 19.3 CISG,
which contains a useful guide to delimit what is a material
change of the offer's terms, the UCC says nothing on this sub-
ject. A result has been abundant litigation, in spite of Official
Comment 4, which indicates that an alteration is material if in-
71 See Wladis, supra note 46, at 1049. The words unreasonably and reason-
ably are also used in comments 4 and 5 to describe the clauses that materially
alter or do not alter the offer. It is important to note that it is not the materiality of
the term, but the materiality of the alteration wrought by it, that is the standard of
Section 2-207 (2)(b); compare with Brown, supra note 24, at 933, who understands
that the substantiality must refer to the contract and not to the offer.
72 See Baird and Weisberg, supra note 41, at 933, discussing the dramatic
change in the traditional rules of offer and acceptance.
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corporated without express awareness by the other party re-
sulting in surprise or hardship for him. Some examples are a
clause negating such standard warranties of merchantability,
and those requiring a shorter period for complaints than usual.
Comment 5 points out as well examples of material alterations:
a clause setting forth and perhaps enlarging slightly upon the
seller's exemption from liability due to supervening clauses be-
yond his control, and so on.73
b) When the contract is not concluded in accordance with
section 2-207 (1) UCC
In all the circumstances in which, in accordance to subsec-
tion (1), the contract is not concluded, but there is some kind of
conduct (generally acts of performance of the contract) that in-
dicate its existence, the last subsection comes into play. Subsec-
tion (3) examines the hypothesis in which the exchanged forms -
the writings of the parties- do not establish the contract, but the
contract is established by their conduct. Applying the knock-out
rule, the contract is composed of the terms from which one can
derive a common will, and terms determined in reference to the
rules contained in other provisions of the UCC.
B) The UNIDROIT Principles
In general, the formation provisions of the UNIDROIT
Principles take as a model Part II of the 1980 Vienna Sales Con-
vention. However, the Principles approach to the battle-of-the
forms is different from that of the Convention. Article 2.22
states that:
Where both parties use standard terms and reach agreement ex-
cept on those terms, a contract is concluded on the basis of the
73 See Official Comments 4 and 5 to section 2-207 UCC: Uniform Commercial
Code 69. Other clauses that usually are deemed to materially alter the elements of
the offer are: arbitration clauses; clauses that forsee the lawyers fee; clauses that
alter the quantity term in a requirement or output contract, and so on. See also
WHITE AND SUMMERS, supra note 63, at 33. They seem to understand that terms
which materially alter those of the offer are not only those that refer to the price,
quality, quantity, and delivery terms, but also those usually incorporated at the
back of documents which are not discussed. See id. See also Williston, supra note
39, at 205. Despite of the help in interpretation provided by Comments 4 and 5, it
is pointed out that they may not be applied and interpreted literally as is usually
done by the courts.
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agreed terms and of any standard terms which are common in
substance unless one party clearly indicates in advance, or later
and without undue delay informs the other party, that it does not
intend to be bound by such a contract.7 4
UNIDROIT Principles art. 2.11 entitled "Modified Accept-
ance" corresponds to CISG art. 19(1) and (3). However, the
UNIDROIT Principles do not apply to the battle-of-the-forms
scenario. In this regard, the drafters considered that the appli-
cation of Principles art. 2.11 would lead to the application of the
last-shot rule. This shows that the norms of the UNIDROIT
Principles, Chapter 2, could be used, but the drafters chose to
elect another regulation. In fact, the drafters recognize the pos-
sible application of the last-shot-rule when parties clearly indi-
cate that the adoption of their standard terms is an essential
condition for the conclusion of the contract, but not if the parties
have made a mechanical reference to the standard terms, una-
ware of the conflict between their respective standard terms. 75
The Principles start from the presumption that forms are
not read, and it is not appropriate to build into the contract
terms not agreed upon. Principles art. 2.22 seeks to foster the
objectives of UCC § 2-207 and overcome last shot theories by at-
tempting to formulate a neutral solution where only the terms
agreed upon form the contract, and conflicting terms are elimi-
nated. Therefore, the UNIDROIT adopted a knock-out rule.76
74 CISG Article 2.209 (Conflicting General Conditions) Principles of Euro-
pean Contract Law indicates that: "(1) If the parties have reached agreement ex-
cept that the offer and acceptance refer to conflicting general conditions of
contract, a contract is nonetheless formed. The general conditions form part of the
contract to the extent that they are common in substance. (2) However, no contract
is formed (a) if one party has indicated in advance, explicitly, and not by way of
general conditions, that he does not intend to be bound by a contract on the basis of
paragraph 1; or (b) if later on, one party, without undue delay, informs the other
party that he does not intend to be bound by such contract. (3) General conditions
of contract are the terms which have been formulated in advance for an indefinite
number of contracts of a certain nature." Id.
75 See UNIDROIT art. 2.22 cmts. 2 and 3.
76 To help understand this effect, the following illustration is given: "A orders
a machine from B indicating the type of machine, the price and terms of payment,
and the date and place of delivery. A uses an order form with its 'General Condi-
tions of Purchase'printed on the reverse side. B accepts by sending an acknowledge-
ment of order form on the reverse side of which appear its own 'General Conditions
of Sale.' When A subsequently seeks to withdraw from the deal it claims that no
contract was ever concluded as there was no agreement as to which set of standard
terms should apply. Since, however, the parties have agreed on the essential terms
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Principles art. 2.22, and other provisions, regulate the two ba-
sic questions affecting the battle of the forms, "Is the contract
concluded?" And if so, "What are the terms?"
1) Rules to determine the conclusion of the contract
The rule recited in Principles art. 2.22 applies to an ex-
change of forms between the parties. 77 If only one of the parties
uses a form, this rule will not be applied because art. 2.22
clearly restricts its application to the situation in which "both
parties use standard terms." According to art. 2.19,78 the gen-
eral rules on formation of the contract will become applicable,
as well as those rules dedicated specifically to standard clauses,
except Principles art. 2.22. There must also be differences be-
tween some or all of the standard terms exchanged by the par-
ties and an agreement on at least the essential terms of the
contract. The need for agreement on at least the essential
terms is derived from Principles art. 2.19 and the rest of Chap-
ter 2, which leads to the straight application of art. 2.2 which,
as a parallel to CISG art. 14(1), demands the intention of the
offeror to be bound in case of acceptance and that offers be suffi-
ciently definite. In every case, if the indicated conditions are
satisfied, the contract is deemed to be concluded.
One result of the application of the Principles is, by virtue
of a presumption that the parties have agreed on the essential
terms, that existing discrepancies around some standard terms
may be rebutted. The parties may exercise either of the two
options. First, one party clearly 79 communicates, after the con-
clusion of the contract, without undue delay, his intention not to
be bound to the contract (right to an immediate avoidance of the
contract). Second, before the conclusion of the contract, one of
of the contract, a contract has been concluded on those terms of the contract and on
any standard terms which are common in substance." UNIDROIT art. 2.22 cmt. 3.
77 "Standard terms" are defined as: "provisions which are prepared in ad-
vance for general and repeated use by one party and which are actually used with-
out negotiation with the other party." UNIDROIT art.2.19(2)
78 UNIDROIT art. 2.19 indicates that: '"Where one party or both parties use
standard terms in concluding a contract, the general rules on formation apply, sub-
ject to UNIDROIT arts. 2.20-2.22." Id.
79 In relation to what should be understood by "clearly," UNIDROIT art. 2.22
cmt. 3, indicates that: "the inclusion of a clause of this kind in the standard terms
themselves will not normally be sufficient since what is necessary is a specific dec-
laration by the party concerned in its offer or acceptance." Id.
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the parties declares the same intention. This implies an obliga-
tion of an immediate indication of acceptance. It is important to
understand that the general rules of the formation of the con-
tract are completely operative. Therefore, it is necessary that
the standard terms be accepted by the other party. There is a
presumption that the standard terms on both forms, which are
not common in substance, have not been assented to. There-
fore, they are displaced in accordance with the rules for deter-
mining the content of the contract.
2) Rules for determining the content of the contract
Agreed upon essential terms become part of the contract.
Where there are standard terms which are common in sub-
stance, these terms become part of the contract. Common in
substance includes clauses which in their essential aspects,
either by content or by finality, may be considered as equally
satisfying the interests of both parties. Where there is disa-
greement about some clauses, the knock-out rule is applied,
thus canceling contradictory clauses and excluding those, which
even though are not contradictory, alter the terms of the offer or
acceptance. Where there are no material alterations,
UNIDROIT Principles art. 2.11 will apply. The acceptance
which contains non-material variations is deemed part of the
contract. Variations that materially alter the offer may be
deemed mutually excluded in accordance with Principles art.
2.22. In case of conflict between a standard term and a term
which is not standard, the latter prevails (Principles art. 2.21)80
80 See Cour d'appel de Grenoble, 24 January 1996 (France). There, the con-
tract contained a liability clause which incorporated the carrier's standard condi-
tions of sale. This clause limited the carrier's liability to $50.00 per shipment.
According to the Court, "while every single page of the contract bore the signature
of both parties, the general terms, printed in miniscule lettering, had been neither
signed nor initialed by the client, and that as a consequence, it was not possible to
establish that it was aware of these terms at the time of signing the contract." Id.
The Court concluded that the general terms clause limiting liability to a nominal
sum so low as to constitute virtually no compensation at all, ran counter to the
principle of acceptance of liability spelled out in the contract. See id. The Court
held that "there was a principle, in international trade law, that 'in the event of
incompatibility between a standard clause and a non-standard clause, the latter
prevails (UNIDROIT art. 2.21)' and that 'if contract terms are unclear, an interpre-
tation against the party that supplied them is preferred (UNIDROIT art. 4.6)."' Id.
The conclusion was clear: the general term was invalid. See id. See also the ab-
stract in English and French in 1 UNIFORM LAW REVIEW 180 (1997).
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as the most likely reflection of the intention of the parties.,'
Standard terms whose content 2 or language, whether material
or formal,8 3 are of such a character that the other party could
not reasonably have expected them, do not become part of the
contract (Principles art.2.20, Surprising Terms).8 4 Criteria of
interpretation are provided in the second paragraph of this arti-
cle. To determine whether a term is of such a character content,
language and presentation shall be considered. There is no gen-
eral rule under the Principles permitting a court to strike an
unconscionable contract term.8 5 Finally, the interpretation of
standard terms does not follow the general rule set forth in the
Principles art. 4.1 which regards the interpretation of the inten-
tion of the parties (similar to CISG art. 8(1) and (2)). The stan-
dard terms will be interpreted, considering their special nature
and purpose, in accordance with the reasonable expectations of
the average users of standard terms and conditions.8
6
81 See Principles of European Contract Law, art. 5.104 -Preference to Negoti-
ated Terms- which establishes that "Terms which have been individually negoti-
ated take preference over those which are not." Id.
82 UNIDROIT art. 2.20 cmt. 2 indicates that "regard must be had on the one
hand to the terms which are commonly to be found in standard terms generally
used in the trade sector concerned, and on the other to the individual negotiations
between the parties." Id.
83 It is noted that "Other reasons for a particular term contained in standard
terms being surprising to the adhering party may be the language in which it is
couched, which may be obscure, or the way in which it is presented typograph-
ically, for instance in minute print." UNIDROIT art. 2.20 cmt. 3. It is also noted
that "regard is to be had not so much to the formulation or presentation commonly
used in the type of standard terms involved, but more to the professional skill and
experience of persons of the same kind as the adhering party." Id. Lastly, the for-
eign language of the clause could result in surprise to the party who does not fully
understand the language and who could not appreciate all the implications. See id.
84 Similar to this Article, Principles of European Contract Law art. 2.104 -Not
Individually Negotiated Terms- states that: "(1) Contract terms which have not
been individually negotiated may be invoked against a party who did not know of
them only if the party invoking them took reasonable steps to bring them to the
other party's attention before or when the contract was concluded. (2) Terms are not
brought appropriately to a party's attention by a mere reference to them in a signed
contract document." Id.
85 See UNIDROIT art. 7.1(6) cmt. 1 - Exemption clause. However,
UNIDROIT arts. 3.10 and 7.1(6) indicate that an exemption clause may not be
invoked if it would be grossly unfair to do so.
86 See UNIDROIT art. 4.1 cmt. 4 (Intention of the parties).
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VI. THE SOLUTION TO THE BATTLE-OF-THE-FORMS UNDER THE
RULES OF THE VIENNA SALES CONVENTION
Several interpretative approaches have been applied to the
Vienna Sales Convention, which clearly destroy the principle of
uniform application of the rules of the Convention. These theo-
ries include that the Convention simply does not apply to the
battle-of-the-forms, the application of general principles of the
Convention in lieu of its specific provisions, the implicit exclu-
sion of CISG art. 19, and the partial application of CISG art. 19.
Finally, this article will analyze the rules of Part II of the Con-
vention and the manner in which these rules fit the conflict of
standard terms. It is an accepted view that the Convention
rules are thorough enough to solve the battle-of-the-forms con-
flict. The battle-of-the-forms is the central focus of this article
because it is one of the most controversial aspects of CISG art.
19. It is controversial because its application to the classical
situations, where an offer and an acceptance are not contained
in forms, is not in doubt.
The text of CISG art. 1987 is as follows:
A reply to an offer which purports to be an acceptance but
contains additions, limitations or other modifications is a rejec-
tion of the offer and constitutes a counter-offer;8 8
(2) However, a reply to an offer which purports to be an ac-
ceptance but contains additional or different terms which do not
87 Principles of European Contract Law, art. 2.208 -Modified Acceptance-
states that: "(1) A reply by the offeree which states or implies additional or differ-
ent terms which would materially alter the terms of the offer is a rejection and a
new offer. (2) A reply which gives a definite assent to an offer operates as an ac-
ceptance even if it states or implies terms additional to or different from the terms
offered, provided the additional or different terms do not materially alter the terms
of the offer. The additional or different terms then become part of the contract. (3)
However, such a reply will be treated as a rejection of the offer if: (a) the offer
expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer; or (b) the offeror objects to the
additional or different terms without delay; or (c) the offeree makes his acceptance
conditional upon the offeror's assent to the additional or different terms, and the
assent does not reach the offeree within a reasonable time." Id.
88 BGB § 150.2 Eine Annahme unter Erweiterungen, Einschrankungen oder
sonstigen Anderungen gilt als Ablehnung verbunden mit einem neuen Antrage.
However, in the German Civil Code, there is no difference between material modi-
fications and non-material ones, even though the case law has succeeded in re-
laxing the norm. In Austrian law, following the German example, it is indicated
that an acceptance with modification is also a counter offer. See STERN, supra note
30, at 47; and BYDLINSKI, supra note 35, at 71.
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materially alter the terms of the offer constitutes an acceptance,
unless the offeror, without undue delay, objects orally to the dis-
crepancy or dispatches a notice to that effect. If he does not so
object, the terms of the contract are the terms of the offer with the
modifications contained in the acceptance;8 9
(3) Additional or different terms relating, among other things,
to the price, payment, quality and quantity of the goods, place and
time of delivery, extent of one party's liability to the other or the
settlement of disputes are considered to alter the terms of the of-
fer materially.90
According to CISG art. 19(1), the reply to an offer which
does not match exactly with the terms of the offer is a rejection
and constitutes a counter offer. This paragraph states the
traditional principle known as the mirror image rule. CISG art.
19(2) seeks to relax the rule recited in CISG art. 19(1). It carves
out from the CISG art. 19(1) rule additional or different terms
which do not materially alter the terms of the offer. The divid-
ing line between a material and a non-material alteration is of
great importance because only the latter constitutes an accept-
ance. Nevertheless, it can sometimes be difficult to draw the
line, despite the CISG art. 19(3) list of examples. This list is
non-comprehensive because it contains the expression "among
other things" reinforced by the phrase "are considered to alter
the terms of the offer materially."91
89 See UNIDROIT art. 2.11 (2) (Modified acceptance) and ULF art. 7 (1964).
90 The UNIDROIT has no article similar to CISG art. 19(3). However, the
UNIDROIT comments reach the same result by enumerating the terms listed in
CISG art. 19.3, and thus consider them as material.
91 There are judicial decisions on the materiality of the alteration contained in
the reply to the offer:
See LG Baden-Baden, 14 August 1991 (Germany) (UNILEX), published in
Recht der Internationalen Wirtschaft, 1992, p. 62-63: A clause that states that the
notice of defects are valid only if made within 30 days after the date of the invoice
is not a material alteration of the offer;
-OLG Hamm, 22 September 1992 (Germany) (UNILEX): considering a mate-
rial alteration a counter offer relating to the packaging of bacon (the offer stated
"in Saicken" while the counter-offer said "losen");
-LG Giessen, 22 December 1992, affirmed by OLG Frankfurt am Main, 4
March 1994 (Germany) (UNILEX). In this case, the court considered additions
and variations in the acceptance related to the payment (the addressee replied,
insisting on advance payment or the opening of a letter of credit), as well as the
change in the quality offered. For a similar view relating to payment terms under
the ULF, see OLG Hamm, 21 March 1979 (Germany);
1998]
41
PACE INT'L L. REV. [Vol. 10:97
A) The exclusion of the rules of Part II of the CISG
Some commentators believe that the battle-of-the-forms
problem is not solved by the rules of the Convention and, there-
fore, the regulation of the battle-of-the-forms must be found in
the applicable domestic law.92 This article asserts that the con-
flict between terms is regulated by the norms dedicated to the
offer and acceptance in the Vienna Convention. The forms ex-
-Cdmara Nacional de adelacions en lo Comercial, 14 October 1993 (Argen-
tina) (UNILEX), judging a forum selection clause;
-Cour de Cassation, 4 January 1995 (France) (UNILEX), commented on by
Claude Witz, Le premier arr~t de la Cour de cassation confronta a la Convention de
Vienne sur la vente internationale de marchandises. -Note sous Cass. 1re civ., 4 Jan.
1995, RECUEIL DALLOZ SIREY 289 (1995); and TomAs Vazquez Lepinette, La Con-
servaci6n de las Mercancias en la Compraventa Internacional: Primera Juris-
prudencia, REVISTA GENERAL DE DERECHO 3437 (1996). In this case, the order
stated a future revision of the price in case of a decrease in market prices, while
the seller's reply stated a future revision according to both an increase and de-
crease in market price. The seller was not able to confirm the order with regard to
some of the items. See id. The Appellate Court held that the reply by the seller did
not materially alter the terms of the offer. See id. This statement was confirmed
by the Supreme Court. See id.
See also OLG Muinchen, 8 February 1995 (Germany) (UNILEX): the reply (de-
livery July, August, September, October) to an offer (delivery between July and the
15th August) is a counter offer; OLG Hamm, 6 April 1978 (Germany); OLG
Hamm, 7 December 1978 (Germany); and OLG Hamm, 17 December 1981 (Ger-
many) for the ULF.
See OLG Frankfurt am Main, 31 March 1995 (Germany) (UNILEX), which
declared that a contract was not concluded, since the offer stated the quality of the
glass ("Fiolax"), while the purported acceptance stated ("Duran") and there was no
subsequent conduct of the parties showing the existence of the contract. See id.
92 See von HUBER, supra note 35, at 413, who, referring to Article 17 of the
1978 Draft Convention, thinks that it is a question of validity, so its regulation
must be decided by the applicable domestic law through the application of CISG
art. 4. Nevertheless, he indicates that if only one of the parties uses general condi-
tions, its validity will be regulated by the Convention rules. See id. See also Fran-
cois Dessemontet, La Convention des Nations Unies du 11 Aril 1980 sur les Cntrats
de Vente Internationale de Marchandises, in LES CONTRATS DE VENTE INTERNATIO-
NALE DE MARCHANDISES 56 (F. Dessemontet, ed., 1991); Monique Jametti Greiner,
Der Vertragsabschluss, in DAS UNCITRAL-KAUFRECHT IM VERGLEICH ZUM OSTER-
RICHISCHEN RECHT. WIEN: MANZ 46 (P. Doralt, coord., 1985); HOLGER MULLER &
HANS- HERRMAN OTO, ALLGEMEINE GESCHAFTSBEDINGUNGEN IM INTERNATIONALEN
WIRTSCHAFTSVERKEHR 40 (1994); Beverly M. Carl, Contratos Internacionales: la
Compraventa de Mercaderfas entre Empresas de Paises con Distintos Sistemas
Jurdicos, 34 REVISTA DE LA FACULTAD DE CIENCIAS JURIDICAS Y POLITICAS, UNIVER-
SIDAD CENTRAL DE VENEZUELA 341 (1989), who points out that a good solution may
be the one contained in section UCC §2-207 (3). See also PICH, supra note 25, at
1089, who believes there is a gap filling when a contradiction between clauses ex-
ists, and although he explains the two main solutions to this problem, he does not
choose one.
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changed, although long and preprinted, are offers, acceptances
and counter offers 93 and the legislative history of CISG art. 19
leads to the same conclusion. During the task of revising the
rules on formation contained in the ULF, it was proposed that a
new paragraph be added to ULF art. 7 which attempts to find
an acceptable solution to the contradiction between clauses.
In spite of the complicated writing of this proposal, it was
considered that it dealt with a practical problem and provided
an acceptable solution. However, the Working Group decided to
reject the proposed paragraph because if an acceptance con-
tained any material alterations to an offer, it should constitute
a rejection of that offer, whether those material alterations were
in the printed or in the non-printed terms of the acceptance. 94
Because the view that all the clauses of a contract should have
the same value, the proposal was rejected. Therefore, the con-
flict between terms should not be solved by giving preference to
written terms over printed terms. Instead, the conflict should
be solved with the general rule of ULF art. 7, which requires a
material agreement between the terms of the offer and the
acceptance.
In the last stage of the legislative process of the Conven-
tion, during the Vienna Diplomatic Conference, the Belgian del-
egation proposed to add a new paragraph to Article 17 of the
1978 Draft Convention (subsequently CISG art. 19). The text of
the proposal sought to explicitly regulate the content of the con-
tract when a battle-of-the-forms exists. The text of the propo-
sal, which was ultimately rejected, is as follows: "When the
offeror and the offeree have expressly (or implicitly) referred in
the course of negotiations to general conditions the terms of
93 See Oberster Gerichtshof, 6 February 1996 (Austria) (UNILEX), indicating
that since the CISG does not have any express rule dealing with general condi-
tions, the formation rules apply. Also, the negotiations and the practices estab-
lished between the parties must be taken into account. See also OLG Hamm, 18
October 1982 (Germany): applying the ULF formation rules to determine the in-
clusion of general conditions to the contract. See also PERILLO, supra note 17, at
289, who believes the formation rules are not useful to solve battle-of-the forms
problems.
94 See generally, UNCITRAL Yearbook, vol.VIII, p. 82. See also HONNOLD,
supra note 22, at 284.
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which are mutually exclusive the conflict clauses should be con-
sidered not to form an integral part of the contract."95
The delegates seemed to agree that the proposal could not
be discussed during such an advanced stage of the text at the
Draft Convention. Additionally, some representatives strongly
opposed the amendment, asserting that it was contrary to the
law of contracts. Additionally, they believed the question was
solved by the text of the Draft Convention. 96 This amendment
proposed by Belgium does not mean, as some scholars state,
that the battle-of-the-forms is a gap in the Convention. On the
contrary, it shows that a different solution to the one in CISG
art. 19 was proposed, without success. From the legislative his-
tory, one can readily conclude that the battle-of-the forms is
regulated by the Vienna Convention rules on formation. It is
difficult to solve the question of its regulation through CISG
art. 19 or, as one sector of scholars believes, by applying the
general principles of the CISG or even indicating that an im-
plied exclusion of Article 19 is produced. The final result of the
last two positions is the establishment of control over contents
of a contract. These viewpoints, however, are not in keeping
with the application of uniform norms as a central objective of
the Convention.
B) The application of the general principles of the Convention
The legislative history of CISG art. 19 indicates that the
battle-of-the-forms is regulated under the offer and acceptance
norms recited in the Vienna text. Therefore, there is no justifi-
cation for turning the legislative history upside down and argu-
ing that the battle-of-the-forms is a gap in the Convention, only
to be solved by the application of the general principles on
which the Convention is based (CISG art.7). Even so, there are
scholars who feel uncomfortable with the rule of CISG art. 19
because they think that it is not appropriate to decide an issue
involving a battle-of-forms but, at the same time, they think it
95 Official Records (A/CONF.97/C.1/SR.10, in A/CONF.97/19 at 288-289.
Some authors take advantage of this rejection to place the battle-of-the forms
outside the scope of the Convention. See Jan Heliner, The Vienna Convention and
Standard Form Contracts, INTERNATIONAL SALES OF GOODS 342 (1986).
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is undesirable to abandon the question to domestic law (funda-
mentally because it will go against the objective of uniform ap-
plication of the Vienna text (CISG art.7)). These scholars have
well based theories that support the thesis that it is a gap.
They assert that this gap is solved by applying the general prin-
ciples of the Convention (CISG art.7). Under this reasoning, a
problem that receives an express solution and that leads to a
high degree of certainty in the law, is fabricated and becomes
absurd.
One of these theories is based on the invalidity of acts of
performance as an acceptance (CISG art. 18) when there is a
battle-of-the-forms. In that circumstance, it is said a valid ac-
ceptance cannot exist, and the contract is not concluded under
the scope of the Convention.97 Proceeding from this premise,
any battle-of-the-forms is said to be solved by the application of
the general principles of the Convention (CISG art.7). The gen-
eral principles which are taken out of Part II of the Convention
include the necessity of a definitive and sufficient agreement,
that, in conformity with CISG art. 14, consists of an intention to
be bound in case of acceptance, as well as an agreement over the
terms of goods, price, and quantity. When these terms are pres-
ent in a battle-of-the-forms scenario, it is asserted that a valid
contract, although incomplete, will exist. In order to furnish
any missing elements of the contract, the general principles ex-
pressly mentioned in CISG art. 7 are asserted. The resulting
contract will include the common terms from both set of forms,
and any terms in conflict will be supplied as the court deems
appropriate. In addition, all the circumstances of the case, the
97 See VAN DER VELDEN, supra note 22, at 241 and Moccia, supra note 39, at
667. Another commentator finds it difficult to evaluate the acts of performance as
acts of acceptance when there is a battle of the forms. See Mario Frigo, L'Efficacia
delle Condizioni Generali di Contratto alla luce delle Convenzioni di Roma e di
Vienna del 1980, 537 DIRI rO DEL COMMERCIO INTERNAZIONALE, (1993). See also
Louis DelDuca and Patrick DelDuca, Practice Under the Convention on Interna-
tional Sale of Goods (CISG): A Primer for Attorneys and International Traders
(Part II), 29 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE L. J. 122 (1996), who state that the CISG
does not give any answer where there is a battle-of-the-forms conflict and a subse-
quent performance of the contract. Therefore, the general principles of the CISG
and private international law must be looked at to resolve such questions.
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parties' interest, and the media, will be taken into
consideration.98
The foundation upon which this theory is based however, is
not solid because Part II of the Convention contains express
norms which can be applied. To apply the general principles of
the Convention, there must be a matter that is regulated by the
Convention, but not expressly settled in the Convention (CISG
art.7(2)).
C) The implicit exclusion of Article 19 CISG
Other scholars, 99 unsatisfied with the result reached fol-
lowing the rules of the Convention, particularly CISG art. 19,
have attempted to construct an original, but artificial, theory to
do away with the contradiction of terms. If the parties have
agreed on essential terms and have performed the contract in
spite of the existence of contradictions between terms, then
there is a tacit derogation of CISG art. 19. In the opinion of
these scholars, the contract performance is the determining fac-
tor from which they draw the following conclusions: a) the im-
plied derogation of CISG art. 19; b) the performance of a valid
contract; and c) the exclusion of the contract content from the
contradictory clauses. The only one believed to be correct is the
second one: the performance of a valid contract. The other two
appear to magically complete the thesis they wish to support.
In the first place, the contract performance by the recipient
of the counter-offer indicates objective, subjective, and reason-
able assent to an offer. There is no reason to support a tacit
98 See VAN DER VELDEN, supra note 20, at 243; See also Moccia, supra note 39,
at 667. Other authors simply indicate that the general principles of the CISG con-
tained in Part II are applied. See Louis DELDUCA and E. GUTTMAN, Problems and
Materials on Sales Under the Uniform Commerical Code and the Convention on
International Sale of Goods, COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS, VOL. 2, 176 (1993).
Others say that the battle-of-the forms is a gap in the Convention, because the
Belgian proposal was rejected during the Diplomatic Conference. See HELLNER,
supra note 93, at 342; and Drobnig, supra note 30, at 126 (indicating that the solu-
tion does not give an answer to the problems, without mentioning the Belgian
proposal).
99 See generally STAHL, supra note 34, at 381; and LUDWIG, supra note 38, at
412, who, although in favor of the application of the last-shot rule, thinks the tacit
derogation of Article 19 is possible when it could be derived from an usage of trade
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derogation from CISG art. 19. In the second place, even assum-
ing that the last shot rule does not apply, this result is un-
founded. Following the same reasoning, it could be deemed that
the first shot rule or some other rule applies.
D) The partial application of Article 19 of the CISG
In contrast to most of the doctrinal thesis that defend
either an integral application, or a total exclusion of the rules of
the Convention, specifically Article 19, there is also a thesis
that suggests a partial application of Article 19 to solve the con-
flict of the battle-of-the-forms.
Some authors, among them Professor Diez-Picazo, under-
stand that the two basic questions to be answered when there is
a battle-of-the-forms are: Is there a contract? And if so, What is
its content? They believe consideration of these two questions
require separate regulations. CISG art. 19 is typically applied
to situations where there are no acts of performance by the par-
ties. If there is performance, however, these authors believe the
problem is not one of formation, but one concerning the determi-
nation of the content of the contract (which does not turn on
formation norms). To determine which terms will remain to
create the content of the contract, they propose a solution very
similar to the one adopted by subsection (3) of Section 2-207
UCC (knock-out rule). In this way, the contract is built on com-
mon terms, as well as those supplied by the dispositive law,
general principles of contract interpretation and, in particular,
business usages and good faith. 10 0
This partial application of the Convention rules is said to
respond to the difficulty of applying the Vienna rules when, af-
ter the acts of performance by the parties, the contract is
deemed not to be concluded under Articles 18 and 19 of the Con-
vention. It is understood that Article 18(3) of the CISG ignores
the existence of situations where there is acceptance by conduct
(of the type described in Section 2-207 (3) UCC). Those who
100 See Luis Diez-Picazo, "Condiciones Generales de la Contrataci6n y Cldusu-
las Abusivas," In Encuentros sobre Derecho Iberoamericano, Derecho Privado,
Fundaci6n BBV, 1995, p.8; and Una nueva doctrina general del contrato? Anuario
de Derecho Civil, 1993, tomo XLVI, fasc.IV, p.1716; See also Bernard Audit, La
Vente Internationale de marchandises (Convention des Nations-Unies du 11 Avril
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subscribe to the partial application of Article 19 conclude that if
you want to escape this labyrinth, then domestic law must be
applied. An acceptable alternative solution is the one contained
in Section 2-207 (3) UCC. 1° 1 However, this division in the appli-
cation of the Convention rules has no justification. The rules of
the Convention -and only these rules- provide comprehensive
regulation of the formative scheme of the contract and the tradi-
tional declarations of will in the form of offer and acceptance.
The exchange of forms is regulated in its entirety by the Con-
vention, as will be examined next.
E) The search for uniformity: Articles 18 and 19 CISG
Examination of two solutions to the problem represented by
contradiction of forms -the application of rules on offer and ac-
ceptance, or content control- we see that neither is entirely per-
fect. The Convention's rules, which center around Articles 18
and 19 are reviewed below.
1) Rules to determine the conclusion of the contract
With the objectives of certainty and security in contracting,
the Vienna drafters decided to apply rules of offer and accept-
ance along with acts of performance to solve the issue of the
battle-of-the forms.
a) If the offeror-buyer sends to the offeree-seller a purchase
form as a way to manifest his offer and in response receives a
separate form from the seller, usually neither form is signed.
This conflict of forms materially alters the offer and the pur-
ported acceptance is really a rejection under Art. 19(1) and
19(3) of the CISG. This rejection could be considered a counter-
offer capable of acceptance only if it satisfies the essential ele-
ments of Article 14(1) of the CISG. In this situation, if the seller
(new offeror) sends the goods, the reception and acceptance by
the buyer -who does not raise objections- may be deemed an ob-
jective manifestation of acceptance of the counter-offer that con-
101 A slight variation of this thesis is one which understands that Article 19(2)
may be applied when there is a non-material modification, with domestic law ap-
plied when there is a material modification: See HELLNER, supra note 93, at 341-
42 and 351 et seq, who, nevertheless, finally indicates that it is preferable that the
battle of forms no be regulated by the Convention, supporting his opinion by refer-
ence to the rejected Belgian proposal.
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cludes the contract in accordance with the terms of the counter-
offer. 102
b) If the offeror-seller sends his form and the buyer adds to
the reply terms that materially modify it, this is a counter-offer
and a rejection of the original offer, similar to the previous hy-
pothesis. If, subsequently, the seller decides to send the goods,
this act is an indication of assent to the counter-offer of the
buyer. This indication of assent, in order to comply with the
requirements of "reaching" of the Convention, must reach the
offeror (art. 18(1) in relation to 24 CISG). This requirement
may be satisfied by the arrival of the goods or a notice informing
of the dispatch of the goods. When the offer, practices estab-
lished between the parties, or usages indicate that the seller is
not required to communicate the acceptance, the sending of the
goods concludes the contract (art. 18.3 CISG). 10 3
The legislative history of Article 19 CISG documents its ap-
plicability to situations in which there are conflicts between
clauses contained in the purchase and sale forms. When there
is an exchange of forms, their terms must be compared to deter-
mine if there are variations which may be deemed material. Ar-
ticle 19 of the CISG does not apply to exchanges of forms when
there is no departure in the reply to the offer. In this case, the
only articles of the Convention that will play a role will be Arti-
102 See CISG art. 18.1. Many Vienna scholars agree that the Convention ap-
plies the last-shot-rule. NEUMAYER could not be more explicit -even though he dedi-
cates a significant part of his article to questioning the advantages and
disadvantages of different solutions- and indicates that the knock-out rule does not
find support in the Convention. See NEUMAYER, supra note 38, at 524. See also
HERBER AND CZERWENKA, supra note 34, at 107.
HONNOLD thinks that two theories, with opposite consequences, might be ad-
vanced: 1) When seller received no acceptance to the counter-offer, he accepted the
initial offer by shipping the goods; 2) Buyer, by receiving and accepting the goods,
accepted Seller's counter-offer. See HONNOLD, supra note 22, at 195. The first the-
ory, however, is contrary to the Vienna Convention because a reply to an offer with
material alterations is a rejection and a new offer (art.19(1) and (3), in relation
with Article 17), should make it impossible to revive an original offer. See the criti-
cism of Professor Honnold's position by Moccia, supra note 41, at 673-674. Some
authors do not analyze the problem by taking into account the acts of performance,
but in a theoric plane of exchange of forms they indicate that contradictions of
forms are always material, so the contract is not concluded. See NEUMAYER AND
MING, supra note 34, at 185-86.
103 See Pilar Perales Viscasillas, Contract Conclusion Under CISG, 16 J. OF L.
AND COMMERCE 315, (Issue 2) 1997.
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cles 14(1) and 18(1) CISG. The rules applicable to most ex-
changes of forms are:
When the form, sent as a reply to an offer form contains
additional or different terms that materially alter the offer, it
cannot be deemed an acceptance by mandate of Article 19(1).
Such a reply is a rejection and a counter-offer; it is a new offer
that must be accepted to conclude the contract. Frequently,
there will be acts of performance which under the norms of the
Convention, can be regarded as acts of acceptance.
The critics or detractors of this understanding undermine
the meaning of the Convention when they conclude that the
acts of performance cannot be considered as an assent to the
terms of the counter-offer form. 10 4
The indication of assent to the offer, in the cases cited here,
derive from the realization of an act -sending or acceptance of
the goods- from which the Convention infers an act of will. The
Convention under Article 18(1) (A statement made by or other
conduct of the offeree indicating assent to an offer is an accept-
ance) places both indications of assent in the same position.
Unlike acceptances by oral or written declarations of will, ac-
ceptance by performance yields two results: the sale contract is
concluded and, simultaneously, the contract enters the execu-
tion phase. The consent, necessary for the contract's formation,
is normally manifested in such cases by the sending of the goods
104 See VELDEN, supra note 20, at 241. He takes the position that mere acts of
performance cannot be deemed an acceptance of these terms. See id. In his view,
for this to happen, the offeror must be aware of the contradictions between the two
sets of forms, and that such awareness can be demonstrated. See id. For example,
when he makes acts of performance in conformity with the conditions of their
counterpart and, at the same time, in disconformity with his own. See id. This
thesis is confusing; we cannot understand how an act of execution (acceptance of
the goods or payment of the price) can show conformity with, for example, an arbi-
tration clause in the counter-offer and, at the same time, indicate a rejection of his
previous requirement that disputes be submitted to the courts. See id. See also
Stoffel, supra note 34, at 75. He states that the conditions which must be met for
an acceptance by acts of performance in accordance with Article 18(3) CISG are
doubtfully satisfied when there is a battle of the forms followed by acts of perform-
ance. See id. He would solve the battle-of-forms problem by applying the applicable
substantive law. See id.
See Walter F.VonPetzinger, "Battle of Forms" und Allgemeine Geschaftsbed-
ingungen im amerikanischen Recht. Recht der Internationalen Wirtschaftrecht,
1988, p.679; and see HERBER AND CZERWENKA, supra note 34, at 106, for authors
who understand that such an acceptance is in conformity with Article 18 CISG.
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by the seller or the reception of the goods by the buyer - acts
that coincide with the commencement of performance or the to-
tal performance of the sales contract.
It seems clear that these are acts which can show individ-
ual will, without being concerned with recognition of discrepan-
cies in the forms. It is not accepted opinion that the Vienna
Convention protects carelessness in not reading the forms. The
Vienna text mandates that acts of performance made in a con-
clusive way are sufficient to demonstrate assent to a previous
declaration of will and to conclude the contract. If there is a
counter-offer followed by an act of performance by the ad-
dressee, the contract is deemed concluded because this situation
is objectively understood as an act of acceptance. 10 5
2) Rules to determine the content of the contract
a) When the reply form could be deemed as an acceptance
because it does not depart materially from the offer, then, in
conformity with Article 19(2) CISG, the terms of the contract
will be those of the offer, as well as those contained in a reply
that "contains additional or different terms which do not mate-
rially alter the terms of the offer. The offeror, however, has an
opportunity to prevent the incorporation in the contract of such
additional or different non-material terms by objecting to them
"without undue delay."
b) When the reply to an offer form has additional or differ-
ent terms that materially alter the offer, it will be regarded as a
rejection and a counter-offer. Such a counter-offer may be ac-
cepted by acts of performance. Where there is such a counter-
offer and acceptance by acts of performance, in the classic sense
105 For case law under the CISG applying the rules of formation of a contract
(offer and acceptance) to determine the inclusion of general conditions at the back
of the forms, see OLG Saarbrucken, 13 January 1993 (Germany) (PACE)
(UNILEX): Cour d'Appel of Paris, 13 December 1995 (France) (PACE) (UNILEX);
and Amtsgericht Kehl, 10 June 1995 (Germany) (PACE) (UNILEX).
The following cases, judged under the Hague Formation Law, have applied the
last-shot-rule to battle-of- the-forms disputes: LG Landshut, 14 July 1976 (HK 0
135/75) (Germany); OLG Hamm, 18 October 1982 (2 W 29/82) (Germany); HOF S-
Gravenhage, 25 March 1983 (Netherlands); LG Bielefeld, 5 June 1987 (12 0 122/
86) (Germany). See also the comment LG Bielefeld by I. Schewnzer, "The-Battle-of-
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of Articles 14 and 18 CISG, the terms of the contract will be
those of the counter-offer.
3) Some conclusions
Examining the method of determination of contract terms
by applying a knock-out rule, whereby common terms are added
to the contract and contradictory terms excluded, reveals there
is merit to a rule which draws the contents of the contract from
the terms of one party in conjunction with acceptance by per-
formance. While far from perfect, there are more advantages to
this approach than many detractors of the mirror-image rule
and last-shot rule acknowledge.
The principle of mutual identity between the terms of the
offer and the acceptance has an undeniable virtue: the mirror
image and last-shot rule provide a certainty and legal security
for the parties which is reinforced by the special configuration of
paragraphs (1) and (3) of Article 19, which list elements that
materially alter the offer. Although this solution is rigid, in ad-
dition to legal certainty, it provides adequate protection to the
parties in the majority of cases 10 6 and permits enterprises to
more accurately plan their standardized transactions. From
the standpoint of certainty, a mere comparison between the
purchase and sale forms is sufficient to enable courts and par-
ties to determine the concordance or discordance of the forms.
Additionally, the manner in which enterprises have satisfacto-
rily planned their standardized transactions in the face of such
rules is well recorded. 0 7
Also, the Convention's rule is not rigid in all respects.
There are opportunities in the Convention to temper unduly
harsh results in appropriate cases. For example, domestic un-
conscionability doctrines can enter the equation via CISG art. 4
(a), or similar results can be achieved through use of the Con-
vention as "yardstick for the validity of clauses that the parties
106 This is acknowledged by authors such as Vergne, supra note 25, at 254, who
is not a supporter of the Article 19 rule. He points out that the solution of Article
19 is simpler and easier to apply than Section 2-207 UCC. See also Ugo Draetta,
La Battle of Forms nella prassi del commercio internazionale, RmSTA DI Dmiwro
INTERNAZIONALE PRIVATO E PROCESSUALE, 326, n. 12, 1986 (a supporter of the last-
shot rule).
107 See Murray, supra note 21, at 291.
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have not really agreed upon but that one has imposed upon the
other through the use of standard terms . . ."108
VII. THE VIENNA CONVENTION RULES, SECTION 2-207 UCC
AND THE UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES: A COMPARISON
Solutions to battle-of-the-forms scenarios are summarized
under three legal regimes: the UCC, the CISG, and the
UNIDROIT Principles. For this purpose, we use fact patterns
provided by Professors White and Summers in their evaluation
of the UCC. 109
A. Exchange of forms with terms that do not modify the offer
materially
a) Scenario one. The seller sends to the buyer an offer.
Seller's form provides that the goods are to be packed in safe
bags. The buyer decides to accept the offer sending his own
form, and it is received without any objection by the offeror.
Buyer's form states that the goods are to be packed in new bags.
A few days later, the market price of the goods drops dramati-
cally; the bargain is no longer attractive to the buyer.
b) Solution according to Section 2-207 UCC. If, as it seems,
there was a definite and seasonable acceptance and the clause
included in the acceptance is not regarded as a material altera-
tion to the offer, the contract will be concluded and the terms of
the agreement will be determined depending on the thesis
adopted: a) if the different terms are included in subsection (2)
of section 2-207 UCC, the goods are to be packed in new bags: b)
if one chooses the opposite solution: b.1) for Professor White,
we apply the knock out rule; b.2) for Professor Summers, the
different terms of the acceptance are excluded; consequently,
108 See OLG Hamm, 29 April 1982 (Germany), published in IPrax, 1983, p. 231
(ULIS). See also PETER SCHLECHTRIEM, THE SELLER'S OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF
GOODS IN INTERNATIONAL SALES, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS
FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS, 6-6, (1984), citing the ULIS case.
109 See WHITE AND SUMMERS, supra note 63, at 28-52. They study 8 cases that
will be analyzed in this section in both in their basic structure, and, in order to
have a better understanding, with some variation in fact pattern. This section will




PACE INT'L L. REV.
the terms of the offer prevail, which means that safe bags must
be used.
c) Solution according to the Vienna Convention. Here too,
we assume that the reference to "new bags" in the reply does
not materially alter the terms of the offer ("safe bags"). The con-
tract is concluded; its terms are those of the offer, except its
packing clause which is replaced by the packing clause con-
tained in the acceptance: packing in new bags (CISG art. 19 (2)).
d) Solution according to the UNIDROIT Principles. A strict
application of Article 2.22 of the Principles leads to the applica-
tion of the knock-out rule and cancellation of the different
clauses. However, since the remainder of the rules on formation
of contracts also apply, Article 2.11, parallel to CISG art. 19,
will come into play and the solution is the same as under the
Convention.
B. Exchange of forms with terms that materially modify the
offer
a) Scenario two. The exchanged forms are identical except
that the reply contains a clause calling for the arbitration of
disputes.
b) Solution according to Section 2-207 UCC. Pursuant to
UCC 2-207(2) UCC, the contract is concluded, since there is a
definitive and seasonable expression of acceptance. The arbitra-
tion clause is an additional term that materially alters the offer.
Therefore, in accordance with UCC 2-207(2), it is not incorpo-
rated in the contract.
c) Solution according to the Vienna Convention. The con-
tract is not concluded because there is a material alteration
(art. 19(3)). This converts the reply to a rejection and a counter-
offer (art. 19(1)). There will be no contract unless there is fur-
ther manifestation of some type of acceptance.
d) Solution according to the UNIDROIT Principles. The
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C. An exchange of forms with contradictory terms followed by
the performance:
a) Scenario three. The buyer's offer is accompanied by a
form that contains an arbitration clause. The seller's acceptance
is accompanied by a form in which he indicates that disputes
will not be decided by arbitration. The seller delivers the goods
and the buyer receives and pays for them. A dispute arises.
Must it be resolved before an arbitrator?
b) Solution according to Section 2-207 UCC. If it is assured
that there is a definite and seasonable expression of acceptance
(subsection (1)) and that the contract is concluded, to determine
the content of the contract we proceed to subsection (2). Profes-
sor White, relying on Comment 6, will apply subsection (3). The
result is that the contradictory clauses "knock-out" one another;
the parties will not be required to resolve their dispute by arbi-
tration. Professor Summers, on the contrary, does not believe
that Comment 6 is applicable to the exchange of forms. It is his
view that "different terms" will not bring Section 2-207 UCC
into play, because it only refers to additional terms. The terms
of the offer will control the content of the contract and the par-
ties will resolve their dispute before an arbitrator.
c) Solution according to the Vienna Convention. The buyer's
form is an offer -assuming it contains the elements required by
Article 14 CISG. The seller's reply form is not regarded as an
acceptance, since it introduces a term "arbitration" which mate-
rially alters the terms of the offer. In accordance with Article
19(1) and (3) CISG, the seller's reply must be regarded as a re-
jection of the offer or a counter-offer. This counter-offer is ac-
cepted by the buyer at the reception of the goods (CISG art.
18(1)). The arbitration clause is not included in the content of
the contract.
d) Solution according to the UNIDROIT Principles. In con-
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D. Term included in the offer but not in the acceptance
following the performance
a) Scenario four: Exactly as specified in the previous hy-
pothesis, except that the seller's form says nothing with regard
to the settlement of disputes.
b) Solution according to Section 2-207 UCC. It is deemed
that the seller who does not add any term accepts the terms
contained in the buyer's form.
c) Solution according to the Vienna Convention. Since the
acceptor-seller has given an answer to the offer that does not
include additions, limitations, or modifications, the contract is
concluded when the seller's form is received by the offeror. It is
composed of the terms of the offer, including the buyer's arbitra-
tion clause (CISG arts.14 and 18.2 in relation to articles 23 and
24).
d) Solution according to the UNIDROIT Principles. It can
be said that there is no agreement with respect to the arbitra-
tion clause proposed by the offeror, since the offeree responded
with his own form which contains nothing in relation to the res-
olution of the disputes. In accordance with Article 2.22, the ar-
bitration clause will not become part of the content.
E. Term added in the acceptance but not in the offer followed
by the performance
a) Scenario five. This is the opposite of the previous hypoth-
esis, in other words, the buyer sends an offer that is silent about
the resolution of the disputes and receives as a reply the seller's
form in which he adds an arbitration clause.
b) Solution according to Section 2-207 UCC. In accordance
with Section 2-207 (1), the seller's form will be treated as an
acceptance. To determine the terms of the contract, one must
refer to subsection (2). An additional term, such as an arbitra-
tion clause, would usually be regarded as a material alteration,
therefore the arbitration clause will not be incorporated into the
contract.
c) Solution according to the Vienna Convention. The reply of
the seller is clearly a counter-offer because it adds a term that
alters materially the offer (CISG arts.19(1) and 19(3)). This
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counter-offer is accepted by the buyer by accepting the goods;
the arbitration clause is therefore applicable.
d) Solution according to the UNIDROIT Principles. The
seller's arbitration clause would be excluded from the content of
the contract in accordance with article 2.22.
F. Term added in the acceptance along with a "defensive
clause"
a) Scenario six. Exactly the same as the previous hypothe-
sis except that in his reply to the buyer's offer, the seller has
stated that the contract may only be concluded on the basis of
seller's terms.
b) Solution according to Section 2-207 UCC. There can be
several solutions under this Section: If the phrase is considered
an expressly conditioned acceptance, seller's reply is regarded
as a counter-offer. The result is clear where there is an express
statement of acceptance by the buyer but, as often happens, the
buyer simply accepts the goods. This raises a question: Is this
an acceptance of the term introduced in the seller's form? Many
UCC courts answer that it is not. Instead, they apply the knock
out rule and the arbitration clause is not considered part of the
contract. A similar result would apply should seller's condi-
tional phrase be regarded as unclear.
c) Solution according to the Vienna Convention. The same
as indicated in the previous hypothesis. The condition imposed
by the offeree simply confirms that which article 19(1) already
states.
d) Solution according to the UNIDROIT Principles. Accord-
ing to the Principles, the solution will turn on two factors: first,
whether seller's conditional intent is clear; second, whether
seller's intent is expressed in a standard clause or a non-stan-
dard. A non-standard clause will prevail over a standard clause
(CISG art.2.21). This is a case in which the knock-out rule of the
Principles will not apply.
G. The offeror includes a "defensive clause" and the acceptor
adds an arbitration clause
a) Scenario seven. The offeror-buyer is silent on the subject
of arbitration but insists that only his terms may be considered
19981
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a part of the contract. The seller-offeree accepts, adding an ar-
bitration clause.
b) Solution according to Section 2-207 UCC. The UCC's so-
lution depends on the interpretation given to the requirement of
the offeror. If we construe it as conditioning the existence of the
contract to the acceptance of the offeror's terms, any other ele-
ment introduced by the offeree does not become part of the con-
tract; the terms of the offer control the content of the contract.
If the interpretation does not lead to this result, the two first
subsections of section 2-207 will not apply; Instead, subsection
(3) applies where the offeror/offeree exchange is followed by per-
formance. Nevertheless, the solution will be the same; the con-
tract will not include the arbitration clause.
c) Solution according to the Vienna Convention. If it is clear
that the offeror insists that all his terms must be accepted by
the offeree-seller, an offeree's reply containing a material term
not mentioned by the offeror must be considered a rejection of
the offer, as well as a counter-offer (CISG art.19(1) and (3)).
The counter-offer may be accepted by an act of performance,
such as reception of the goods (CISG art.18).
d) Solution according to the UNIDROIT Principles. The so-
lution is exactly the same as under the previous hypothesis,
with the difference that the terms of the contract will be the
those of the offer; therefore, the arbitration clause will not be
incorporated in the contract.
H. Exchange of documents different from the forms
a) Scenario eight. This section refers to cases where the
existence of the contract is unclear but there have been previous
negotiations.
b) Solution according to Section 2-207 UCC. Until there is
performance of contractual duties of the parties, an agreement,
or an exchange of documents that so indicates; the existence of
a contract cannot be affirmed. Conversely, if there is no evi-
dence of the writings by the parties, but there are acts of per-
formance, Section 2-207 (3) will not be applicable because it
presupposes writings between the parties. In any case, Section
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c) Solution according to the Vienna Convention. If there is
no identifiable sequence of declarations of will in the form of
offer and acceptance, but there is performance, nothing pre-
vents the application of the general principles of the Conven-
tion; the contract will be concluded.
d) Solution according to the UNIDROIT Principles. The
contract is understood to be concluded as indicated by the be-
havior of the parties as relevant proof of its existence (CISG art.
2.1).
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